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The New Pennsylvania Drunk Driving
Law: Last Call for the One-For-The-
Road Era
I. Introduction
In Pennsylvania, alcohol-related fatal accidents have increased
by one hundred and fifty-four percent between 1972 and 1981,' with
eight hundred and twenty-three persons losing their lives in 1981.2
In response to these grim statistics and the pressure exerted by civic
organizations,' Governor Richard Thornburgh signed a bill enacting
one of the most severe anti-drunk driving laws in the nation on De-
cember 15, 1982. The new law, which became effective at 12:01 a.m.
on January 14, 1983, 4 amends the prior law that had been in force
since July 1, 1977. 5
1. GOVERNOR'S DUI TASK FORCE REPORT, at 1 (October 14, 1982, Harrisburg, PA)
[hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S REPORT]. Over a ten year period, 45,000 U.S. troops were
killed in Vietnam, while nationwide, 250,000 Americans have died as a result of drunk driving
accidents over the past decade. This figure represents an average of 25,000 deaths a year, or 68
a day, which is five times the number of U.S. combat deaths in Vietnam. Driving Drunks Off
The Road, CHANGING TIMES, July 1982, at 51.
2. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 1, adding that in 1972, there were 324 fatal
accidents and 2888 injury accidents that were alcohol related. By 1981, those figures had risen
to 823 fatalities and 11,860 injuries. See Appendix A. In comparison, nationwide statistics
indicate that the number of serious injuries exceeds 650,000 a year, with over half of the coun-
try's traffic deaths resulting from drunk driving accidents. Driving Drunks Off the Road, supra
note 1, at 5 1, adding that the national economic loss sustained from drunk driving incidents is
calculated at $21 billion to $25 billion annually.
3. The Pennsylvania Chapter of Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD), through its
lobbying efforts, was instrumental in getting the new law passed. See Bill-Signing Culminates
Personal Campaign, THE PENNSYLVANIA LAWYER, January 15, 1983, at 24. (Governor Thorn-
burgh prasied the organization for demonstrating what can be accomplished by a "citizen's
group with a very real concern.") MADD was founded by Candy Lightner, of Fair Oaks,
California, in August 1980. Currently, the organization consists of forty-seven chapters in
twenty-one states. The Pennsylvania Chapter of MADD was founded by Marie Tursi, who
also serves as a member of the Governor's DUI Task Force, and presently consists of fourteen
state branches and over a thousand members. Further information may be obtained by writ-
ing to: MADD, P.O. Box 124, Horsham, Pennsylvania 19044; or MADD, 5330 Primrose, Suite
146, Fair Oaks, California 95628.
4. The bill's supporters wanted the Governor to sign the bill at an earlier date so that it
would take effect in time for the 1982-83 holiday season and possibly reduce the number of
alcohol-related traffic deaths that normally occur during the Christmas-New Year period.
Thornburgh to sign drunken-driving bill, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 15, 1982, at 8. In
response, Governor Thornburgh repeatedly stated that because of the importance of this legis-
lation, he did not want to rush his staff's review of the proposed law. Thornburgh to sign bill on
drunken driving, The Philadelphia Inquirer, December 15, 1982, at 1.
5. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 102, 1532, 1534, 1543, 1547-49, 1552, 3715, 3731, 3732,
3735, 3755, 6146, & 6323 (1977) (amended 1982).
Under Act 289,6 motorists now face a possible conviction for the
new crime of driving with a 0.10% or greater blood alcohol content.7
Pursuant to this amendment to the state Vehicle Code, a chemical
test indicating a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or more is conclusive
evidence of driving under the influence, and supporting evidence is
no longer required.' As a consequence of a first-time conviction,
under the new per se rule,9 a violator is subject to a mandatory forty-
eight hour jail sentence and a minimum three hundred dollar fine.' °
After a brief overview of the prior law" and a summarization of
the new law,' 2 this comment examines the problems associated with
Pennsylvania's recently enacted anti-drunk driving legislation.
13
Constitutional considerations receive particular attention,'4 followed
by a brief analysis of similar laws in other states.' Finally, the com-
ment proposes a number of practical recommendations designed to
strengthen the new law's deterrent effect. 16
II. Development of the New Law
A. Background
As early as 1909, the Commonwealth enforced a stringent anti-
drunk driving law.' 7 The first such law provided for a minimum fine
and/or imprisonment upon conviction of operating a motor vehicle
when intoxicated.'" This early law further sanctioned a six month
suspension of the licensing privileges of anyone thus convicted.' 9
6. Act of Dec. 15, 1982, ch. 75 (to be published in 1982 Pa. Laws).
7. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(4) (1983). The full title of the section is "Driving
under influence of alcohol or controlled substance." This comment does not explore the intri-
cacies of a conviction for driving under the influence of controlled substances.
8. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note I, at 10. See infra notes 63, 93-94 and accompany-
ing text.
9. "[Tlhe illegalper se law establishes as a traffic offense the operation of a motor vehi-
cle with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) equal to or in excess of a specified level-typi-
cally 0.10 percent w/v." NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., ALCOHOL & HIGHWAY SAFETY LAWS: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW 49 (1980) (Pub. No.
l)OT-HS-805-173).
10. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(1)(i) (1983).
11. See infra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text (legislative history), and notes 59-109
and accompanying text (overview of the new law).
13. See infra notes 110-99 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 200-56 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 257-76 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 277-90 and accompanying text.
17. Act of April 27, 1909, ch. 9, 1909 Pa. Laws 265.
18. No person when intoxicated shall operate a motor vehicle, and any person guilty
of so doing shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100), nor
more than three hundred dollars ($300), or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both; and the license of any person guilty of a violation of this section may be
suspended for six months by the Highway Commissioner.
Id
19. Id. This law, as well as its successors up to 1976, also imposed a legal duty on an
owner to ascertain whether another person was intoxicated before permitting that other person
to operate the owner's vehicle. If the motorist turned out to be intoxicated, the render was
By 1919, the statutory definition had evolved to preclude the
operation of any vehicle "while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any narcotic or habit producing drug. .. ."2 Similar to
the later drunk driving laws2' that derived from this prototype, the
early law failed to provide any criteria evidencing guilt, yet imposed
strict monetary penalties and/or terms of incarceration. For exam-
ple, a violation of the 1919 law was a misdemeanor that subjected a
convicted motorist to a fine ranging from one hundred to five hun-
dred dollars, or up to one year in prison, or both-subject to the
court's discretion.22 This definition of the offense remained rela-
tively unchanged, with the exception of minor variations and addi-
tions,23 until 1976. In that year, the Pennsylvania Legislature
produced Act 81,24 which is the drunk driving law that was recently
amended by Act 289.25 The 1976 law attempted to clarify the offense
by prohibiting the driving of any vehicle while the operator is under
the influence of alcohol to the extent that he is incapable of safe
driving.26
Act 81 utilized a standard under which a blood alcohol content
(BAC)27 reading of 0.10% or greater created only a presumption that
a defendant was driving under the influence (DUI).28 The prosecu-
subject to the same penalties as those confronting the offending driver. See, e.g., Washabaugh
v. Fickes, 9 Adams L.J. 1 (1967).
20. Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 23, 1919 Pa. Laws 678 (emphasis added).
21. It was not until 1976 that the legislature provided a standard of guilt to assist police
officers in deciding whether a motorist was DUI. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (1977)
(amended 1982) provided that, for a driver to be guilty of DUI, he must be incapable of safe
driving. The earlier laws did not attempt to define the term "driving while intoxicated."
22. Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 23, 1919 Pa. Laws 678.
23. In 1923, the penalty was increased to a fine of $100 to $500 and/or up to three years
imprisonment. 1923 Pa. Laws 718, § 20 (June 14, 1923). The subsequent years witnessed a
fluctuation in the amount of the fine, but the maximum jail term remained three years. The
1959 law adopted the $100 to $500 fine range, as well as the imprisonment scheme, but added
several new categories of vehicles: "It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor
vehicle, tractor, streetcar or trackless trolley omnibus, while under the influence. ... Act of
Apr. 29, 1959, ch. 1037, 1959 Pa. Laws 58.
24. Act of June 17, 1976, ch. 75, § 1, 1976 Pa. Laws 162, (codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3731 (1977) (amended 1982).
25. See supra note 6.
26. (a) Offense defined.
A person shall not drive any vehicle while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapa-
ble of safe driving;
(2) under the influence of any controlled substance. to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safe driving; or
(3) under the combined influence of alcohol and a controlled substance. ...
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a) (1977) (amended 1982).
27. Blood alcohol content (BAC) is the amount of alcohol by weight found in an individ-
ual's blood. This ratio is usually expressed as a percentage, e.g., one-tenth of one percent
(.10%). GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
28. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(d)(3) (1977) (amended 1982). In addition, if the
BAC test results showed 0.05% or less, a presumption existed that the person tested was not
DUI. If the test indicated a BAC in excess of 0.05%, but less than 0.10%, that fact did not a
create a presumption, but could be considered with "other competent evidence." Id. at
§ 1547(d)(2) & (3).
tion undertook the often impossible task of proving beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the accused lacked the ability to operate a vehicle
safely because of the amount of alcohol he had ingested. In Com-
monwealth v. Slout,29 the superior court summed up this burden,
stating: "To establish that appellant was guilty. . ., the Common-
wealth had to prove (1) that he was operating a motor vehicle
(2) while under the influence of alcohol.""a Additional case law in-
dicates that this two-prong burden of proof often was not easily
met.3 1 The presumption of DUI was considered to be a mere "stan-
dardized permissible inference, ' ' 32 and, therefore, a defendant's fail-
ure to produce contrary evidence did not authorize the direction of a
verdict against him. The state was required to present evidence, usu-
ally in the form of eyewitness testimony, to lay a solid foundation of
guilt.
33
Furthermore, because of the presumptive nature of BAC evi-
dence, the accused could rebut it by introducing evidence at trial that
although he had consumed a quantity of alcoholic beverages, he in-
deed was capable of exercising cautious driving skills. 34 Frequently,
the courtroom became the site for a battle of experts. The prosecu-
tion would proffer "expert" testimony that any person having a BAC
as high as the defendant's necessarily was inebriated to the point of
29. 288 Pa. Super. 471, 432 A.2d 609 (1981).
30. Id. at 474, 432 A.2d at 610 n.4.
31. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 225 Pa. Super. 513, 312 A.2d 430 (1973) (holding
that where defendant contended he was a passenger and the state's evidence relied solely on an
eye witness who had arrived four to six seconds after impact, the prosecution failed to prove
that defendant was the operator of the vehicle). See also Commonwealth v. Prosser, 18 Mercer
L.J. 27 (1980) (holding that where there was an open beer bottle between defendant's legs
when he was discovered sleeping in his vehicle, the chemical test was questionable since there
was no way of knowing the lapse of time between driving and testing). Contra, Common-
wealth v. Devereaux, - Pa. Super. __, 450 A.2d 704 (1982) (holding that the eyewitness ac-
count of a person who had arrived on the scene one minute after the accident was sufficient to
prove that defendant was the operator).
32. Commonwealth v. DiFrancesco, 458 Pa. 188, 329 A.2d 204 (1975).
What the statute refers to as a "presumption" is, strictly speaking, only a stan-
dardized permissible inference. . . . According to this view, an inference is merely a
logical tool which permits the trier of fact to proceed from one fact to another. A
presumption, on the other hand, is a procedural device which not only permits an
inference of "presumed" fact, but also shifts to the opposing party the burden of
producing evidence to disprove the presumed fact.
458 Pa. at 193, 329 A.2d at 207 n.3. Accord, Commonwealth v. Gearhart, 253 Pa. Super. 238,
384 A.2d 1321 (1978) (holding that a presumption of intoxication does not establish defend-
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
33. Eg., Grundy Appeal, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 693 (Bucks 1972) (holding that where appel-
lant was found asleep in the driver's seat surrounded by the odor of alcohol, it was just as
reasonable to assume that upon entering the vehicle he realized his condition and took the
precaution of sleeping it off); Commonwealth v. Balmer, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 560 (Del. 1970)
(holding that the odor of alcohol alone is insufficient to establish that the accused was driving
under the influence of alcohol).
34. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(h) (1977) (amended 1982) permitted a defendant to
have his own physician administer a blood alcohol test and then offer the results of that test
into evidence. This provision was retained by the new law. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1547(h) (1983). There is no requirement that a police officer inform a suspect of this right.
See Herring v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. Commw. 608, 413 A.2d 1171 (1980).
lacking prudent driving judgment.35 Depending on the financial
means of the accused, the defense would counter with an entourage
of "experts" who would aver that a person of defendant's weight and
stature could consume that much alcohol and still retain the capacity
to engineer his vehicle safely down the highway.36
An additional problem that plagued early prosecutors was the
typical juror's attitude of "there, but for the grace of God, go ." 7
The sole legal issue to be decided by a jury was whether the Com-
monwealth had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
was driving a vehicle in an unfit manner due to his intoxication at
the time of arrest.3 8 Sympathetic jurors, as well as judges, often ne-
gated the state's efforts in establishing guilt by rendering lenient ver-
dicts and sentences. 9
B. Legislative History
Confronted by shocking statistics,' lobbying pressure from
MADD, 4" and the ineffectiveness of the existing DUI law,4 2 Gover-
nor Thornburgh created the "Task Force on Driving Under the In-
fluence of Alcohol and Other Controlled Substances", on October
13, 198 1.3 By December of the same year, the twenty-member Task
35. E.g., Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa. Super. 454, 381 A.2d 1295 (1977) (where the
court heard expert testimony that, given a test reading of. 12%, the defendant would have had
a BAC of .18% at the time of arrest and, therefore, had to have been intoxicated).
36. See generally R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES §§ 5b.03-.05 & 18.06
(3d ed. 1981). Cf. Billow v. Farmer's Trust Co., 438 Pa. 514, 266 A.2d 92 (1970). (Although
this case did not deal with expert testimony offered by defendant, the holding illustrates the
court's reluctance to accept a doctor's opinion that a person with a BAC of .14% would be
impaired in his driving.)
37. Many times a shrewd voir dire examination will eliminate this problem, yet the first
offender who has committed no serious harm usually is accorded sympathetic deference, which
severely hampers successful DUI prosecutions. Memorandum prepared by the Office of Pa.
Representative George E. Saurman (R-Ambler) (Jan. 6, 1983).
38. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
39. Bayley, Driving While Under The Influence: The Law of Pennsylvania, THE DICKIN-
SON SCHOOL OF LAW CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR (Dec. 4, 1982) (lecture on the
Anatomy of a Drunk Driving Trial, prosecutor's problems) [hereinafter cited as DUI
SEMINAR].
The leniency can be explained in part by the fact that the typical drunk driver is
law-abiding in other respects and does not cause harm intentionally. The courts
therefore are reluctant to impose penalties that could wreck a career, leave lasting
psychological damage or worsen overcrowding in the jails.
Driving Drunks Off the Road, supra note 2, at 51.
40. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. Other statistics indicate that someone
dies every 23 minutes as a result of an alcohol-related driving accident and that one out of
every hundred babies born today will die from a drunk driving incident. Tri-County MADD
Statistical Report, Box 46, Enola, PA (January 1983).
41. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
42. Every police officer in America arrests on the average only two DUI offenders per
year. In Pennsylvania, that figure is a scant .6 drunken drivers annually. Stewart, A plea for
drunk driving legislation, Vol. 5. No. 15 PENNSYLVANIA L.J. REPORTER 2 (April 19, 1982).
43. ". . . I created this task force as part of my administration's effort to reduce the
number of drug and alcohol-related traffic accidents in the Commonwealth-accidents which
claimed nearly 950 lives on Pennsylvania roads in 1981 alone." GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra
note I, at 2.
Force had subdivided into four special committees: Legislation,
Public Information and Education, Enforcement, and Alcohol High-
way Safety Programs." As a result of their combined efforts, the
legislative package was introduced in June 1982.
In September, after inserting a number of changes to the origi-
nal version, the House of Representatives sent the approved bill to
the Senate.45 The House version met with staunch criticism cast by
various groups seeking tougher anti-drunk driving laws, and as a
consequence, the Senate Judiciary Committee stripped virtually all
the changes made by the House.46 The Senate then unanimously
passed their revised version, which closely coincided with the origi-
nal recommendations introduced by the Governor's Task Force. 7
Despite the concern that the House might resent the Senate's action,
House Bill 2533 was passed in November, and was signed by the
Governor one month later.48
In addition to the changes in the DUI law itself, several new
offenses were inserted into the Crimes Code from the floor of the
House of Representatives. 49 These new crimes include, for example,
selling or furnishing alcohol to a person under twenty-one years of
age and manufacturing, selling, or carrying a phony identification
card.5 °
C. The Inception
Once Governor Thornburgh signed the bill, Pennsylvania
44. The Task Force consisted of four members of the Governor's Cabinet, four legisla-
tors, three private citizens, two local police chiefs, two highway safety experts, two judges, one
county coroner, a psychiatrist and a chief probation officer. Id. at 3. The legislation commit-
tee concentrated on strengthening the law and streamlining the judicial process. Id at 5. The
education committee focused on providing public information, implementing a media cam-
paign, and developing a statewide alcohol highway safety program. Id. at 19. The enforce-
ment division strove to streamline arrest procedures and increase DUI training programs for
law enforcement agencies. Id at 13. Finally, the prevention branch endeavored to increase
community awareness and citizen support. Id at 25.
45. Brutto, Senate OK's StffPenaties for Drunk Driving, The Patriot (Harrisburg, PA),
November 17, 1982, at D-1.
46. Pennsylvania Senator George W. Gekas (R-Harrisburg), head of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, and Marie Trusi, head of PA. MADD, were the key opponents to the watered
down House version. Pursuant to suggestions made by Pa. Representative George E. Saurman
(R-Ambler), the chief sponsor of the measure, the Senate removed the weak additions, like a
provision that would have expressly allowed a judge to impose a sentence of community serv-
ice on a convicted motorist rather than the mandatory jail term. Id But see infra notes 188-91
and accompanying text.
47. Guida, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39 (lecture on proposed legislation).
48. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
49. See generally 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1982).
50. Memorandum from Frederick D. Giles (Counsel Pa. Senate Judiciary Committee) to
Pa. Senator George W. Gekas (Chairman Senate Judiciary Committee) (October !1, 1982)
(providing a synopsis of HB 2533). A person who distributes alcohol to an individual under
the age of twenty-one is guilty of a misdemeanor III and draws a mandatory $500 fine. An
individual caught manufacturing or selling a phony identification card is guilty of a misde-
meanor II, which carries a $5000 fine. A person using a phony identification card is subject to
a $300 fine under a misdemeanor III conviction. Id.
launched a fifty thousand dollar publicity campaign designed to in-
form the public of the consequences a DUI offender faces under the
new law.5' Approximately one hundred billboards were erected
statewide carrying the slogan: "It's time to treat drunk driving like
the crime it is. The party's over."52 Additionally, over ten thousand
posters and two hundred thousand brochures were printed to dis-
seminate the message.53 This media blitz also included state troop-
ers delivering a stem warning on camera and over the radio.54
Statistics indicate that the promotional effort had an immediate,
positive effect. During the 1982-83 holiday season, the number of
drunk driving fatalities decreased as compared to previous years.
55
Clearly, the most significant characteristic of the new law is the pub-
lic attention it has received. Although enforcement may not increase
rapidly, public indoctrination should serve to deter motorists from
excessive drinking and driving.56 The major impact of the new law,
however, is at the prosecutorial level.57
D. The Impact
An examination of the recently enacted DUI law reveals a
number of key provisions that make the new law tough, but fair.
First, the new law mandates a minimum forty-eight hour jail sen-
tence, a fine ranging from three hundred to five thousand dollars,
and a license suspension of at least one year for convicted first-time
offenders.58 The law, however, also provides a one-time alternative
51. Nussbaum, New drunk law has already had an effect, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan-
uary 16, 1983, at C-I, 6. Although the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(PennDOT) did not announce the launching of the promotional campaign until January 13,
1983, the media coverage of the new law's status generated ample publicity and heightened
civic awareness. Drinking Drivers Told to Beware, The Patriot (Harrisburg, PA), January 14,
1983, at A-6.
52. New drunk law has already had an effect, supra note 51, at C-I, 6.
53. 1d The brochures and posters are being distributed through schools, liquor stores,
law enforcement agencies, Penna. American Automobile Association offices,local government
offices and courts. Drinking Drivers Told to Beware, supra note 51, at A-6.
54. For example, state trooper John Marks appeared on two state-produced TV spots,
somberly stating: "On patrol, I've stopped a lot of drunk drivers. They resent being treated
like criminals." After describing the ramifications of a DUI conviction, the officer admon-
ishes: "For drunk drivers, the party's over." New drunk law has already had an effect, supra
note 51, at C-I, 6.
55. The State Police reported only three fatalities during the 78 hour New Year holiday,
as compared to fourteen deaths the previous year. Id Cf. supra note 4 (concern that because of
the delay in signing the bill, the number of holiday fatalities would not decrease).
56. As Marie Trusi, founder of PA MADD, stated: "We were so pleased with the record
over the holidays. . . . Even the bartenders are telling us, 'Boy, are people being careful.' A
law is just a tool to convince people they have to change their attitudes, and this law just might
be all we need." New drunk law has already had an effect, supra note 51, at C-I, 6.
57. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(d)(3) (1983) (admissibility of evidence of 0.10%
BAC to prove DUI). See also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
58. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1532(b)(3) & 3731(e)(1)(i) (1983). The court is now
required to impose the minimum sentence, which cannot be superseded by the Pennsylvania
Commission on Sentencing Guidelines. Memorandum from Pa. Representative George
Saurman's staff to the Senate Judiciary Committee (October 7, 1982) (discussing the highlights
to trial, conviction, and mandatory imprisonment: The Accelerated
Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. 59 On the other hand,
large fines, long license suspensions, and compulsory minimum jail
terms of thirty days, ninety days, and one year are imposed on sec-
ond, third, and subsequent violators, respectively.6" Additionally,
the new law encourages enforcement by allowing police officers to
use preliminary breath test equipment (PBT) to determine whether
additional blood alcohol testing is warranted.6' If further testing is
indicated, a police officer can require a suspect to submit to any or
all of three major blood alcohol content tests: breath, blood, and
urine.62 At trial, a test result of 0.10% or greater is conclusive evi-
dence of drunk driving,63 and refusal to submit to testing is admissi-
ble in court and results in an automatic one year license
suspension.' The new law also fosters prosecution by prohibiting
magistrates from reducing or dismissing the charges at arraignment
or preliminary hearings.65 Furthermore, the court must utilize the
Court Reporting Network (CRN) to ascertain whether a first-time
offender should be offered ARD or stand trial.6 6 Convicted drivers,
as well as those accepting the ARD alternative, must pay to attend
Alcohol Highway Safety School,67 and an ARD candidate loses his
of the new law). The soundness of this opinion remains to be tested. See infra notes 195-99
and accompanying text.
59. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1542 & 1552 (1983).
ARD is a trial diversion procedure used by the Courts and District Attorneys of
the Commonwealth. Under ARD, criminal charges against a defendant are dis-
missed if the violator agrees to meet certain conditions. According to court rules,
ARD can be offered only to first offenders. It cannot be used for capital crimes ...
GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 32. See also infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
60. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(1)(ii)-(iv) (1983).
61. Id. at § 1547(k). "A preliminary breath test is a chemical test of breath made with a
small, portable breath testing device. A police officer uses a PBT to determine if a person
should be taken to a central testing location and given a full chemical test of breath, blood or
urine." GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note i, at 32. See also infra note 78 and accompanying
text.
62. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1983). Section 102 defines "chemical testing" as:
Analysis performed on a biological material, including but not limited to breath,
blood or urine, to determine the identity or concentration or both of particular con-
stituents such as alcohol or controlled substances. Test procedures may rely on one
or more physical or chemical properties of the constituent and utilize instrumental or
chemical analysis techniques to accomplish the determination.
63. Id. at § 3731 (a)(4). In explaining this new per se law, the Task Force Report analo-
gizes it to the speed limit: "If you drive over 55 MPH, you are breaking the law. Similarly, if
you drive with a blood alcohol content of .10% or more, you are breaking the law." GOVER-
NOR'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
64. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(b)(1)(i) & (e) (1983). See infra note 81 and accom-
panying text.
65. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(f) (1983).
66. Id. at § 1548(a). The CRN is a computer controlled information system that presents
the courts and the district attorneys with a comprehensive "personality and alcohol use profile
of a drunk driver." GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note I, at 32. The CRN maintains data
pertaining to medical history, drinking habits, marital status and education background, and
all such information is kept confidential. Id.
67. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1548(b) (1983). These schools provide education pro-
driving privileges for one to twelve months.68 If a motorist drives
while his license is suspended because of a DUI conviction, the new
law compels him to a pay fine of one thousand dollars and spend a
minimum of ninety days in jail.69 Additionally, the law now enables
Pennsylvania to enter into reciprocal agreements with other states so
that out-of-state DUI convictions will result in license suspensions of
one year in this state.7" Finally, the new law mandates that a driver
convicted of vehicular homicide while driving under the influence
serve a minimum of three years in prison and pay up to a maximum
fine of fifteen thousand dollars.7 '
E. Significant Changes From the Prior Law
The new DUI law amends select provisions of the 1976 Penn-
sylvania Motor Vehicle Code. The amendments do not invalidate
the former law in loto, but do supersede certain sections of the old
law.
The new law lessens the burden of proof needed to charge a
motorist with drunk driving.7 2 Under the prior law, only a person
who "operated" a motor vehicle, while intoxicated, could be con-
victed.73 The present law broadens the scope to include any person
who "drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the move-
ment of a motor vehicle. . .. "I'
Additionally, the new law includes a broader "implied con-
sent" 75 provision than the old law did. The recently enacted law per-
mits one or more chemical tests76 to be taken to determine BAC,
grams at the county level to give DUI offenders the information and skills necessary to help
them avoid committing a subsequent offense. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
68. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(6) (ii) (1983).
69. Id. at § 1543(b).
70. Id. at § 6146.
71. Id. at § 3735(a). See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
72. The new law eradicates the frequently litigated distinction between "driving," "oper-
ating," and "in control of a vehicle." Prior case law indicates that the prosecutor had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle at
the time of the incident. Eg., Commonwealth v. Kallus, 212 Pa. Super. 504, 243 A.2d 483
(1968) (in which the court held that the state must prove that the accused was in the vehicle,
behind the wheel and had control and management of it). See also supra notes 29-30 and
accompanying text. By expanding the scope of persons who may be liable for DUI, the prose-
cution will no longer have to prove a specific person was driving, only that a person was the
"apparent driver."
73. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a) (1977) (amended 1982). As prior case law indi-
cates, the operation of a vehicle was not always considered tantamount to driving it. See, e.g.,
supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
74. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1547(a) & 3731(a) (1983).
75. The premise behind an implied consent provision is that once a driver obtains the
privilege of driving within a given state, by receiving a driver's license, as a condition of that
privilege he consents to chemical testing if arrested for driving under the influence. See gener-
ally Comment, Drunk Drivers Versus Implied Consent. A Sobering New Illinois Statute, 15 J.
MAR. L. REV. 479 (1982).
76. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1983).
while the prior law allowed either a breath or blood test. 77 Further-
more, the current law grants a police officer the right to stop a motor-
ist, based on "reasonable suspicion," and request that the driver take
a pre-arrest breath test.78
Like the old law, if a driver is stopped and "reasonable
grounds" exist to believe that he is DUI, the officer may arrest the
individual and compel him to submit to extensive chemical testing.79
In contrast to the old provision, the amended version further allows
testing when a person is involved in any accident in which another
person, or the driver himself, is treated at a medical facility or
killed. 8° A refusal to submit to testing results in a twelve month li-
cense suspension, an increase of six months as compared to the old
law.8 ' The amended section also broadens the definition of "quali-
fied person(s)" who may administer chemical tests.82
Another innovation involves the driver who is involved in an
accident and is taken to an emergency room for treatment. The new
law, unlike its prior counterpart, sanctions the taking of a blood sam-
ple if probable cause exists to believe that the injured person was
DUI.8 3 This sample must be submitted by attending medical per-
sonnel for BAC testing, and the testing personnel are provided abso-
lute immunity for their compliance.84
When a motorist is charged with drunk driving, the district jus-
tice is barred from reducing or modifying the charge.8 5  This
amended provision eliminates the plea bargaining that occurred
under the prior law, in which the police or magistrate could reduce
77. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1977) (amended 1982).
78. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(i) (1983). The use of the phrase "reasonable suspi-
cion" may indicate that a police officer can initiate PBT procedures on a less than probable
cause basis. The prior law required a standard akin to "probable cause" before an officer even
could stop a DUI suspect. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1977) (amended 1982). See
infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
79. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (1983). The term "reasonable grounds" has been
interpreted to mean probable cause. E.g., Commonwealth Dep't of Transp. v. Schultz, 25 Pa.
Commw. 598, 360 A.2d 754 (1976). The use of PBT, which is based on reasonable suspicion, is
solely to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to arrest a motorist for DUI. 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(k) (1983) (emphasis added). But see infra notes 231-36 and accom-
panying text.
80. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1547(a)(2) (1983). Prior law did not provide for this.
81. Compare 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(b)(1)(i) (1983) with 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1547(b)(1)(i) (1977) (amended 1982).
82. The new law defines "qualified personnel" as any person "who has fulfilled the train-
ing requirements . . . in a training program approved by the Departments of Health and
Transportation." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(c)(1) (1983). Formerly, "qualified person-
nel" meant either "a physician, a technician acting under the physician's direction, or a trained
police officer." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1977) (amended 1982).
83. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3755(a) (1983).
84. Id. at § 3755(b). This section further provides that medical personnel or the hospital
employing them may not administratively refuse to perform such tests. The new law, however,
fails to provide a penalty should a refusal take place.
85. Id. at § 3731(f.
the DUI charge to a summary offense.86
The new law also requires each judicial district to establish an
ARD program for processing first offenders who have not been in-
volved in a serious accident.87 Under the former law, each district
had the option of establishing an ARD program, and the criteria for
accepting offenders varied from county to county.88 Moreover, the
new law imposes minimal conditions on individuals who choose the
ARD alternative; they must adhere to these conditions to avoid trial
and possible conviction for DUI.89 Conversely, the prior law
granted the judge wide discretion in imposing the conditions for suc-
cessful completion of ARD.9° The new law further provides that the
Department of Transportation must maintain the record of a driver
who completes the ARD program for seven years. Completion of
the program is counted as a first offense if the person is subsequently
arrested for drunk driving within seven years of complying with the
conditions of the dispositional alternative.9
The new law retains the definition of the DUI offense used in
the prior law,92 but adds a per se provision to include drivers who
operate their vehicles while having a BAC of 0.10% or more.9 3 In
light of this important addition, the prosecutor's burden now is eas-
ier. If the state can show that the accused's BAC was 0.10% or more
at the time of arrest, a drunk driving conviction inevitably will fol-
low.94 Under the old law, however, the Commonwealth had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the
influence to the point of being unable to drive safely.95 The present
law also permits the admission into evidence of a refusal to take a
chemical test.96 Conversely, Pennsylvania case law interpreted the
86. W. Chisolm, P. Thomas, Comparison Of The Existing Driving Under The Influence
Statutes And The Changes Enacted In Act 289 (HB 2533) at 2 (December 15, 1982) (limited
circulation) thereinafter cited as D UI Comparison].
87. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1552 (1983). A person can be placed on ARD only if he
has not been convicted of drunk driving in the previous seven years, has not killed or injured
someone in connection with the DUI charge, and has not committed any other serious traffic
offenses in connection with the drunk driving charge. Id at § 3731(d).
88. DUI Comparison, supra note 86, at 2.
89. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 373 1(e)(6) (1984). The ARD applicant must agree to pay
for all costs of the program, make restitution to any individual who incurred determinable
financial loss, and seek counseling or treatment if the court orders it.
90. DUI Comparision, supra note 86, at 2.
91. 75 PA. CONS. ANN. §§ 1534(b) & 3731(e)(2) (1983).
92. 75 PA. CONS. ANN. § 3731(a) (1977) (amended 1982). See supra note 26 and accom-
panying text.
93. 75 PA. Co Ns. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a)(4) (1983).
94. Since the crime is driving with a BAC of 0.10% or more, the state need only show that
the accused registered such a level on a chemical test conducted by qualified personnel on
certified equipment. See id at § 1547(c)(1).
95. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(a) (1977) (amended 1982). A prosecutor will still
have to sustain this burden of proof if the case is based on evidence other than BAC results.
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
96. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1547(e) (1984). Concerning the constitutionality of this
provision, see infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
prior law as deeming a refusal to be inadmissible in court.9 7
Another significant change involves the penalties incurred by a
motorist who is convicted of DUI. Under the former law, a convic-
tion was classified as a misdemeanor of the third degree, which im-
posed a maximum penalty of two thousand, five hundred dollars and
a year in jail.9" The new law increases the penalty to a misdemeanor
of the second degree, which carries a maximum five thousand dollar
fine and two years imprisonment and subjects violators to a
mandatory minimum fine and term in jail.9 9 The new law also in-
creases the period of license suspension for a convicted driver from
six months' ° to one year.
10
Currently, if an individual drives while his license is suspended
as a result of a DUI disposition, he can be adjudged guilty of a sum-
mary offense and faces a mandatory fine and jail sentence. 10 2  In
contrast, the old law merely imposed a fine of two hundred dollars
and an additional six month license suspension.
0 3
The new law also incorporates a new crime: "Homicide by ve-
hicle while driving under the influence," which is treated as a felony
of the third degree."° The prior law contained only a general provi-
sion that covered all forms of vehicular homicide.0 5
Finally, in addition to other miscellaneous provisions, 0 6 the
amended law differs from the prior version in the manner in which
DUI fines are distributed to state and local governmental entities.
97. Commonwealth v. Charles, 270 Pa. Super. 280, 411 A.2d 527 (1979) (holding that
admission into evidence of an accused's refusal to submit to testing constitutes a violation of
the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination). Contra, infra note 247 and
accompanying text.
98. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 373 1(d) (1977) (amended 1982).
99. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 373 1(e) (1983). See also supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
100. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1532(a)(2) (1977) (amended 1982).
101. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1532(b)(3) (1983).
102. Id at § 1543(b). See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
103. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1543(a) (1977) (amended 1982). This provision was re-
tained in the new law, but now applies only to non-DUI license suspension cases. 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1543(a) (1983).
104. d at § 3735. The section provides:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person as the direct
result of a violation of section 3731 . . . and who is convicted . . . is guilty of a
felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause of death and the sentencing
court shall order the person to serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less
than three years.
Id at § 3735(a).
105. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (1977) (amended 1982). The present law retained
this section as it applies to non-DUI vehicular homicide. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732
(1983).
106. Other provisions of the new law include, inter alia, the following sections of 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. (1983): It is now unlawful to consume alcohol while driving a motor vehi-
cle. Id at § 3715. Also, Alcohol Highway Safety Schools must be established statewide. Id
at § 1549(b). The new law allows sentencing judges to order chronic alcohol abusers commit-
ted to an appropriate facility or institution. Id. at § 1548(d). Juveniles adjudicated delinquent
because of a DUI violation will now receive a one year license suspension. Id. at § 6323(1).
Unlike the old scheme of monetary distribution, °7 the new plan
calls for the return of a significant portion of collected fines to the
county and local municipalities for use in establishing drug and alco-
hol abuse prevention programs and to underwrite the costs of incar-
ceration.1 8 This final provision may provide an incentive for local
police officers to enforce the law strictly in their respective
municipalities. 109
III. Problems Associated with the New Law
Although Pennsylvania has enacted one of the toughest anti-
drunk driving laws in the country, it remains to be seen whether the
new law will serve as a lasting deterrent. Arguments can be made
that the chemical testing equipment is prone to error"o and that the
method of calculating the blood alcohol content at the time of the
offense is based on erroneous assumptions."' In addition, the new
law will be difficult to enforce if funding remains unavailable." 2
Despite its vulnerability, however, the new law should serve as a val-
uable tool in the Commonwealth's fight against drunk drivers.
A. The Fallibility of Chemical Testing
With the recent addition of a per se provision to the Vehicle
Code, the sole issue to be decided by jurors now will be whether the
defendant had a BAC of 0.10% or greater while driving." 3 The cen-
tral issue of the prior law, whether the accused was incapable of
driving safely, will now exist only in those instances where a chemi-
cal test is not administered to a DUI suspect." 4 Given the severity
107. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3571(b) & 3573(b) (1978) (amended 1982).
108. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3571(b)(4)(i) & (ii) & 3573(b)(3)(i) & (ii) (1983). Al-
though these new provisions took away a portion of the share that the municipalities previ-
ously received, these sections now provide that a certain portion of collected fines are
earmarked for use in administering an effective prevention program and for maintaining ade-
quate jail facilities. The legislators thus have taken away the half share the Commonwealth
formerly received when a local arrest occurred and have given it to the arresting county to
strengthen its DUI program. Thus, a greater proportion of the monies collected from DUI
convictions now flow into the counties to assist them in enforcing the new law.
109. If the county receives money from each DUI fine, it can distribute the funds to im-
prove the law enforcement facilities in the cities within the county's boundaries. This, in turn,
may encourage local police to enforce the law because they know that their facilities will be
improved.
110. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text'
11. See generally Fitzgerald & Hume, The Single Chemical Testfor Intoxication, A Chal-
lenge to Admissibility, 66 MASS. L. REV. 23 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Chemical Test]. See
also, infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
113. The per se crime is driving with a BAC of 0.10% or more, and this is the only fact a
prosecutor must prove to obtain a conviction. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
114. In that situation, a prosecutor must prove affirmatively that the defendant was indeed
unable to operate his motor vehicle in a prudent fashion. See supra notes 92, 95 and accompa-
nying text.
of the new law's penalties," 5 the Commonwealth must utilize equip-
ment and techniques that ensure maximum accuracy, or the
problems of prosecution that existed under the prior law will resur-
face."6 Many scholars believe, however, that the current methods
employed to test for intoxication are unreliable." 7
The new law authorizes police officers to request that a DUI
suspect submit to one or all of three chemical tests." 8  Authorities
agree that the urine test has extremely limited value in determining
the amount of alcohol in a driver's blood, and it has been relegated
to a limited role.' Only under strictly regulated conditions, or for
demonstrating a recent absorption of alcohol, can the test benefit law
enforcement agencies. 2 °
A second method of testing authorized by the amended law, is
blood testing. This type of testing, however, presents a number of
difficulties. First, if a suspect is conscious and inebriated, there is a
greater possibility that he will object to having a needle inserted into
his arm and thus cause injury to himself or another."'2 Second, there
is a distinct possibility that the blood sample may be contaminated
before it reaches the laboratory, and therefore the results will be
questionable at best.' 22 Finally, a state survey indicates that the
methods used to derive a BAC percentage in the best laboratories
yield a standard deviation of at least three percent. 123 Thus, breath
115. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e) (1983). See also supra notes 58, 98-99 and
accompanying text.
116. If the defense can cast doubt on the credibility of the test administrator, or on the
reliability of the equipment itself, the issue again will center on the accused's inability to drive
safely. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
117. Fitzgerald & Hume, Chemical Test, supra note 11, at 23; Comment, Driving With
0.10% BloodAlcohol. Can The State Prove It?, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 817 (1982); NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., METHODS FOR ESTIMATING Ex-
PECTED BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION 2 (1980).
118. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1983). See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
119. Fitzgerald & Hume, Chemical Test, supra note I11, at 23. The new law authorizes
the police to test suspected DUI offenders to determine if their blood contains controlled sub-
stances, as well as alcohol. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1983). The intended purpose
of the urine test is to discover whether a driver has been using controlled substances. Mc-
Conaghie, Pharmacology and Toxicology of 41cohol and its Physiological Effects, DUI SEMI-
NAR, supra note 39, at 2.
120. See R. ERWIN, supra note 36, at § 25.01.
121. The more intoxicated a person is, the less likely that he will freely submit to a blood
test. See Appendix B. Of course, blood testing is a viable alternative when a suspect is uncon-
scious. In contrast, a conscious suspect is more likely to remain docile when a test causes a low
degree of discomfort to his person, like in the case of breath testing. See generally Winek,
Blood41cohol Levels-Factors Affecting Predictions, 19 TRIAL at 41 (January 1983).
122. It is standard procedure for medical personnel to swab the skin with a strong solution
of alcohol before withdrawing blood. This may cause a high BAC result, as derived from the
specimen, even if the suspect has not consumed any alcohol. R. ERWIN, supra note 36, at
§ 1707.
123. McConaghie, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 6. Given a sample containing an alco-
hol level of 0.100%, an analyst may get readings ranging from 0.094% to 0.106%. Of 127
laboratories who participated in a recent survey, the test results of a whole blood specimen
with a BAC of 0.099%, yielded values ranging from 0.084% to 0.113%. Id 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
testing is the most widely used and convenient option for determin-
ing the BAC of a suspected drunk driver. Nonetheless, several ques-
tions have been raised about breath testing as well.
1. The Reliability of Breath Testing Equipment is Often Criti-
cized -In Pennsylvania, local and state police agencies generally
use the Model 4011 AS Intoxilyzer 2 4  and the Model 1000
Breathalyzer 125 to ascertain blood alcohol content. Studies prove
that the Intoxilyzer is significantly less accurate than the
Breathalyzer brand apparatus.
126
The Intoxilyzer functions by emitting infra red light into the al-
cohol vapor of the breath sample. 27 A high concentration of alcohol
in the sample produces a high absorption of light, which in turn is
indicated on a luminous panel in the form of a percentage. 28 The
Breathalyzer, on the other hand, measures the amount of alcohol in
the alveolar breath by forcing the air through an ampoule containing
a solution of potassium dichromate and sulphuric acid. 129 The solu-
tion extracts the alcohol and transforms it into acetic acid, thus caus-
ing the solution to lose some of its original yellow hue. 130  The
higher the BAC of the breath sample, the greater the discoloration in
the test solution.' 3 ' A light then is passed through the test ampoule
and an unadulterated standard ampoule, and the amount of color
change is measured by photoelectric cells. 3 2 The reading then can
be obtained from a gauge connected to a galvanometer.'
33
Breath testing devices generally are accepted in the contempo-
rary scientific and legal communities and are used in all fifty states to
preserve evidence of a DUI violation.' 34 Both pieces of equipment
commonly used in this state, however, are vulnerable to certain
ANN. § 1547(c)(2) (1983) provides that all urine and blood tests should be conducted by a
laboratory licensed and approved by the state Dept. of Health.
124. This model is manufactured by CMI, Inc., P.O. Drawer D, Mintum, Colorado 81645.
125. This piece of equipment is made by Smith & Wesson, the Massachusetts firearms
company.
126. Studies show that the Gas Chromatograph is the most accurate device, deviating only
.003% either way. The Breathalyzer closely follows, deviating only .005%. The Intoxilyzer,
deviating .01%, is the least accurate of commonly used models. Roberts, Theory and Demon-
stration of Breathalyzer and lntoxilyzer, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 3.
127. Intoxilyzer Operators Manual, Model 4011A & A5, at 1.
128. Id
129. State v. Baker, 56 Wash. 2d 846, 851-52, 355 P.2d 806, 809 (1960) (describing the





134. The standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence based on testing devices was
discussed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) (enunciating: "The thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the scientific community"). See also, A. MOENSSENs, R. MosEs, & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 6.29 (1978).
sources of error. For example, the finger marks or oily residue from
the hands of the test administrator may affect the light transmission
through the glass ampoules and result in an erroneous reading. 35 In
addition, stray radio frequency energy, if in close proximity to a de-
vice while a test is being conducted, will cause imprecise results.
136
Extraneous alcohol-base materials, like nail polish, also have been
found to affect the accuracy of the test adversely. 137  Finally, and
most common, the breath sample itself may have been contaminated
by foreign materials like mouthwash, medications containing alco-
hol, cigarette smoke or tobacco juice.
138
Responding to this criticism, the Departments of Health and
Transportation have promulgated a set of rules and regulations that
help to alleviate the cources of error in breath testing equipment. 1
39
These regulations specify strict requirements for the calibration of
911 testing devices and the related keeping of records of the status of
each device. 140  Additionally, the regulations provide training re-
quirements that all persons must meet to qualify as test administra-
tors. 4 ' The rules also mandate that each particular piece of
apparatus be certified by the Department of Health.4 2  The most
important part of the regulations is the five step procedure to which
police agencies must adhere for the test result to be valid."43  This
135. Guth, Principles of Breath Tests and Breath Simulators, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39,
at 7.
136. Roberts, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 3. Only radio frequency energy transmit-
ted, as opposed to received, will affect the devices. 1d Last year, Smith & Wesson acknowl-
edged that police radio equipment causes erratic readings in their Breathalyzer model.
Woestendiek, Some see drunken-driving crackdownfailing the test, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
February 7, 1983, at A-4.
137. Roberts, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 3. Perfumes or colognes that contain a high
percentage of alcohol may also effect the results. Id
138. Id
139. 13 Pa. Admin. Bull. No. 3 at 499 (January 15, 1983) (containing regulations applica-
ble to the maintenance of breath testing equipment and the procedure to be used by qualified
personnel in testing DUI suspects).
140. The regulations require that an accuracy inspection test be conducted on each breath
testing device within thirty days prior to testing DUI suspects. Id § 77.6, at 501-02.
141. To qualify as a test administrator, an individual must complete forty hours of instruc-
tion in subjects like pharmacology, interpretation of findings, and courtroom demonstration.
Id § 77.4, at 501.
142. Id § 77.6(c), at 502. The regulations also provide a full list of approved models that
may be used by state law enforcement agencies. Id. § 77.2, at 500.
143. See generally id. at 499, providing as follows:
1. Tests must be conducted using equipment and by operators approved by the De-
partment of Health or Transportation.
2. Prior to performing any breath test, the subject must be continuously observed
for at least 20 minutes to ensure that additional substances are not ingested and that
the subject's breath is not otherwise contaminated.
3. At least every 30 days each breath testing device must be approved for accuracy
by performing five simulator tests, the results of which cannot show an average
deviation exceeding .005%. Any machine failing this test must be immediately re-
moved from service.
4. The results of accuracy inspection tests must be recorded on forms provided by
or approved by the Department of Transportation.
5. Breath testing devices must be tested for accuracy following the procedures speci-
process assures the maximum precision of BAC results by requiring
a pre-test for accuracy and the continuous observation of a suspect
before actual testing takes place.'" As long as police agencies com-
ply with this procedure, the defendant has no basis for a claim that
the breath testing equipment produced dubious evidence.
2. The Method Used to Extrapolate BA C Results is Questiona-
ble. -In addition to the criticism directed at the breath testing equip-
ment, several studies indicate that the current scientific mode of
predicting the blood alcohol content of an individual at the time of
arrest based on the findings of a later chemical test may be grossly
inaccurate.1 4. Statistics show that the BAC percentage determined
by later testing may be significantly higher than the suspect's actual
BAC at the time of arrest. 1
46
Generally, the ingestion of alcohol causes a person's blood alco-
hol level to rise, as the alcohol is absorbed, until peaking, which is
followed by a gradual decline as elimination takes place. 4 7  Penn-
sylvania courts rely on the assumption that a driver's blood alcohol
content is at least as high at the time of the vehicular offense as it is
at the time of subsequent chemical testing. 148 The courts further as-
sume that alcohol will be absorbed at a constant rate and that a peak
BAC will be reached within approximately forty-five minutes after
the last drink is taken. 4' This latter assumption supports the former
supposition that an individual's BAC is declining by the time the
chemical test is administered. The state then applies these assump-
tions by taking the BAC percentage derived at the time of testing,
fled in this regulation prior to being used for the collection of evidence for prosecu-
tions under Act 289.
144. Id. § 77.5-6, at 501-02. The regulations specify that an accuracy test must be con-
ducted at least every 30 days, but do not make clear whether an accuracy test must be con-
ducted immediately prior to testing a DUI suspect. Step number (5), supra note 143, intimates
that it must; however, there is no section in the regulations that expand on this notion. The
inventor of the Breathalyzer, Robert F. Borkenstein, advocates pre-testing of equipment before
a subject is tested, but the practice in Pennsylvania has been to post-test for accuracy. Guth,
DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 3. Because the law allows only one test within the mode of
testing selected by the arresting officer, it would be more provident to pre-test. Once the breath
test yields a result, the suspect does not have to submit to another breath test. Id
145. See supra note 117.
146. See infra notes 153, 157-61 and accompanying text.
147. McConaghie, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 1, 2, 5. Alcohol can be absorbed
through inhalation, injection, insertion or ingestion. Id at 1. The usual rate of absorption is
75-80% in fifteen minutes, 90% in one hour, and 100% in three hours. Id at 2. The alcohol
level peaks, and then elimination begins through the drinker's saliva, sweat and tears (I to 2%);
urine (10-15%); breath (5-10%); and liver (75-85% metabolized to water). Id at 5. The rate of
elimination is between 0.010 and 0.025% per hour, with an average of 0.015% per hour. Id.
148. E.g., Commonwealth v. Trefry, 249 Pa. Super. 117, 375 A.2d 786 (1977) (holding that
BAC test results obtained 1 1/2 hours after arrest were reliable as indicative of the defendant's
BAC at the time of offense). Accord Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa. Super. 233, 385 A.2d
995 (1978).
149. R. ERWIN, supra note 36, at § 1503. See also Commonwealth v. Hartman, 383 Pa.
461, 119 A.2d 211 (1956) (in which the court accepted an expert's testimony that a peak may be
reached between 15 minutes and an hour, with most people peaking at 45 minutes).
and by using an alcohol elimination rate table, extrapolating the de-
fendant's BAC at the time of the offense.' 50
Typically,' a suspect is taken into custody fifteen to thirty min-
utes after an offense took place. After arrest, the accused is taken to
a police station where a breath test is administered. By the time the
individual's BAC reading is tabulated, two hours have lapsed since
the initial incident occurred. In fact, tests administered as much as
four hours after the offense have been held valid in Pennsylvania. 1
52
The disparity between a driver's BAC at the time of arrest and at the
time of testing is illustrated by the following example.153 A motorist
stops at a restaurant and consumes several drinks while eating a
heavy meal. Upon completion of the meal, he has ingested enough
liquor to give him a BAC of 0.14% when completely absorbed, which
will occur three hours later. While driving home, he has an accident
that takes place thirty minutes after he consumed his last drink. If
he could be tested immediately, a BAC of 0.04% would register.
Since immediate testing typically does not take place, a time lapse
between the incident and testing will affect the driver's BAC percent-
age. If the motorist were tested thirty minutes after his accident, his
BAC would be 0.065%. At one hour after the incident, it would read
0.088%, and after an hour and half-O. 110%, which would indicate
that he was driving under the influence.
The new per se clause proscribes driving while an individual has
150. For example, if a 165 lb. man consumes a six pack of beer in one hour and is in-
volved in an accident thirty minutes after his last drink and is tested 1 1/2 hours after the
accident, the extrapolation will appear as follows:
(alcohol %
150" 4 by volume) (# of I
Peak BAC =- x - X x 0.025% = 0.131%
165 (Man's weight) 50'* 72 oz. drinks)
BAC at time of accident = 0.131 - (1 1/2 x 0.015) = 0.108%
(hrs.) (average rate of elimination)
BAC at time of testing = 0.131 - (3 x 0.015) = 0.089%
(total hours)
*A man weighing 150 lbs. will attain a BAC of 0.025% upon complete absorption of a 12 oz.
beer (4% alcohol).
**The 50 figure is a constant in the formula. McConaghie, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 6.
But see infra note 153 and accompanying text.
151. For a full discussion of this typical scenario, see Fitzgerald & Hume, Chemical Test,
supra note 11, at 24.
152. Commonwealth v. Tylwalk, 258 Pa. Super. 506, 393 A.2d 473 (1978) (holding that
results of a breath test administered four hours after a hit and run accident occurred were
admissible). Accord Commonwealth v. Brubaker, 101 Dauph. I (1979) (four hour delay in
testing does not render results inadmissible). These cases illustrate a change of position from
the courts' earlier holdings. E.g., Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa. Super. 454, 381 A.2d 1295
(1977) (holding that a test delay of 3 1/2 hours made the results speculative at best).
153. For an in-depth discussion of this example, see Fitzgerald & Hume, Chemical Test,
supra note 11, at 33. The authors point out that the assumption used by most states, that the
BAC level is on the decline and any delay between arrest and testing benefits the suspect, is ill-
founded. The defendant actually may be harmed by the extrapolation method used by the
state making the assumption. Id. at 25-26.
a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or greater,'- 4 which is the amount
generally accepted as transcending the bounds of responsible driv-
ing.' 55 A motorist is guilty of drunk driving only if the prosecution
can prove that his BAC exceeded the legal limit during the time he
was operating a vehicle,' 56 not during the time of chemical testing.
Thus, BAC evidence extrapolated from a test that took place a sub-
stantial length of time after arrest may be unreliable in proving the
defendant guilty of DUI.
Additional studies also demonstrate that the assumptions which
led to the computation of uniform blood alcohol content absorption
and elimination time charts are unsupported. 157 Several factors in-
fluence individual blood alcohol levels, especially the individual
rates of alcohol absorption. 58 Certain types of food, depending on
nutritive quality, not quantity, reduce the rate of alcohol absorp-
tion. 5 9 A person's body weight, physical makeup, and emotional
condition also influence the absorption rate.160 Other factors include
the person's speed of drinking, his tolerance to alcohol, and the par-
ticular type of alcoholic beverage being consumed. 16' Therefore,
courts cannot assume that an individual's absorption or elimination
rate will proceed at a uniform rate. Extrapolitations thus are conjec-
tural at best.
Currently, there are no methods used in Pennsylvania to deter-
mine whether an accused's BAC is peaking or declining by the time
he submits to testing. t62 Because the new DUI law nay be consid-
ered a penal statute, 163 a problem arises when a chemical test yields
154. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 373 1(a)(4) (1983).
155. The vast majority of investigators who have studied the relationship between BAC
levels and impairment of driving skills have concluded that a percentage in excess of 0.05%,
but less than 0.10%, will not seriously impair a driver's ability. A BAC percentage of 0.10% or
greater, however, will adversely affect the motorist's ability to drive safely. AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL ASSOCIATION, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER, at 27-34 (1970).
Another commentator points out that a driver with a BAC of 0.08% poses 4 times the risk
of causing a fatal accident as a person who has not been drinking; and a BAC of 0.15% poses
25 times the risk. Note, AlcoholAbuse and the Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1675 (1981). See
also Appendix B.
156. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
157. Fitzgerald & Hume, Chemical Test, supra note 111, at 28-31; Comment, Driving With
0.10% BloodAlcohol, supra note 117, at 823-25.
158. Id at 824.
159. Id. See also Fitzgerald & Hume, Chemical Test, supra note 111, at 29. If aperson
consumes alcohol with a meal, most of the alcohol remains in the stomach with the food. As
the food is digested, the alcohol leaves with the food particles and is absorbed. Carbohydrate
meals are digested very rapidly, while protein meals take longer to digest, and meals contain-
ing a large quantity of fats digest slowly. Thus, the rate of alcohol absorption varies depending
on the type of food ingested. Id
160. Comment, Driving With 0.10% BloodAlcohol, supra note 117, at 825.
161. Fitzgerald & Hume, Chemical Test, supra note 11, at 30. A drink containing no
caloric value, such as vodka, will be absorbed rapidly; whereas, a beverage having a food
value, such as beer, will be absorbed more slowly. Id.
162. Id at 35.
163. Another per se statute, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (CLS Supp. 1982), has been
ruled to be a penal law. Craig v. Melton, 89 Misc. 2d 449, 391 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
a result slightly over the 0.10% limit. Given the fact that a person's
BAC is volatile, the defense could offer evidence asserting that the
suspect's BAC was peaking at the time of testing and, therefore, was
not 0.10% or more at the time of arrest. This is especially possible
when one considers that a suspect is allowed to be tested by the phy-
sician of his choice after the police complete their testing.'64 Thus,
the prosecution may find it difficult to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the driver's BAC at the time of the offense surpassed the
legal amount.
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In contrast, the defense could not make a cogent argument that
the accused's BAC differed from the figure purported by the prose-
cution, if the test is administered within a reasonable time after ar-
rest and indicates a high BAC percentage.166 For example, when a
test is administered within two hours after arrest and registers a BAC
of more than 0.20%, even if an extrapolation is based on the pre-
sumption that the suspect's BAC was peaking, not declining, the cal-
culation will show that the defendant's blood alcohol level exceeded
0.10%.167 Thus, it usually is fruitless for the defense to argue against
the method of computation unless the test results specify a percent-
age level under 0.20%, and the lapse of time between incident and
test exceeded two hours.
B. Practical Problems with the New Law
In addition to the perplexities centering around the reliability of
breath testing devices 68 and the means used to calculate a suspect's
blood alcohol level,'6 9 the amended drunk driving law presents a
number of functional difficulties.
1. A Lack of Enforcement Will Weaken the Law's Deterrent Ef-
fect.-The new law embodies honorable intentions, but cannot act
as an effective deterrent without increased police enforcement
against drunk drivers. Factors indicate that unless the law is strictly
enforced, the deterrent effect will last no longer than approximately
one year.170  The main problem is that the Commonwealth has no
164. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(h) (1983).
165. Because there is no way of telling whether the defendant's BAC was rising or declin-
ing at the time of testing, the defense could introduce-expert testimony demonstrating an extra-
polation, based on a peaking BAC assumption, that would cast doubt on the state's evidence.
Given that the state's burden of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt," the burden cannot be
met if the test results are questionable.
166. Goldberg, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 25.
167. See supra notes 147, 150 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
170. H. LAURENCE Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER 108-11 (1982). The author
also notes that until police are able to catch more than the current figure of one of every 2000
drunk drivers, the stiffer penalties imposed on drunk drivers across the nation will be only a
temporary deterrent. Id at 104-06.
statewide plan to strengthen its enforcement of the new law. 17 1
Pennsylvania simply does not have the money required to imple-
ment its strict stance against the drunk driver.'
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The state receives over 4.3 million dollars in federal aid annu-
ally to assist in the administration of its highways,173 with forty per-
cent of this amount utilized to institute Alcohol Highway Safety
Programs.174 Nevertheless, the high cost of enforcing such a law ne-
cessitates that state and local enforcement agencies receive addi-
tional funds. 175  The solution to this economic dilemma is in
obtaining supplemental federal aid.
On February 7, 1983, the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA) instituted a program to combat the growing
number of state DUI accidents.' 76  If a state meets four criteria es-
tablished by NHTSA, it is eligible for a basic incentive grant of
thirty percent the amount it normally receives each fiscal year.
t77
Furthermore, if a state adopts or implements eight of an additional
twenty-one requirements, it can receive a supplemental grant of
twenty percent of its fiscal apportionment. 17 Thus, if Pennsylvania
could comply fully with the requirements, it could receive an addi-
tional 2.15 million dollars each year in federal funds. 179 Presently,
however, the state fails to qualify for this extra money. NHSTA re-
171. Roberts, Drunken drivers face stifpenalties, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 14,
1983, at 7. (Quoting state police spokesman Tom Lyan, who stated that the Commonwealth
lacks the manpower to enforce the law strictly.)
172. Telephone interview with Brad Mallory, Director of Bureau of Safety Programming
and Analysis of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Feb. 7, 1983).
173. Id
174. Id
175. In Lancaster County alone, the police are using $24,500 in grant money to crack
down on drunken driving. Harry J. Gaab, President of the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police
Association, questioned the ability of the other 1500 municipal police departments in this state
to pay for the extra patrols needed to curb the DUI problem. Hoober, New State Law Makes
Drunk Drivers Scarce, Lancaster New Era (Lancaster, PA), January 14, 1983, at 1, 2.
176. See generally 48 Fed. Reg. 5545 (1983) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 1209).
177. Id at 5553-54 (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. § 1209.5). The four criteria are: prompt
licensing suspension for a period not less than 90 days; mandatory imprisonment for not less
than 48 hours or ten days community service; the establishment of a 10% illegal per se law;
and the increase of enforcement and public information efforts. Id
178. Id at 5554-55 (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. § 1209.6). The criteria are: raising the
drinking age to 2 1; coordination of alcohol highway safety programs; implementation of reha-
bilitation and treatment programs; establishment of a task force; maintenance of a statewide
driver record system; establishment of local safety programs; establishment of prevention and
education programs; screening offenders before sentencing; periodic evaluation of the program
as a whole; establishment of a plan for self-sufficiency; use of roadside sobriety checks; encour-
agement of citizen reporting; enactment of a provision making a BAC of 0.08% presumption
evidence; participation in a Uniform Licensing Procedure; utilization of Preliminary Breath
Tests; limitations on plea bargaining; implementation of a DUI victim assistance program;
mandatory impoundment of offender's car or confiscation of license plates; enactment of a
provision enabling a police officer to decide which test to administer; strengthening Dram
Shop Laws; and developing and making use of innovative programs. Id
179. Pennsylvania currently receives $4.3 million each year. If the state would comply
with the NHSTA guidelines, it could receive 50% of that figure as additional funding. See
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
quires that a state promptly must suspend the licenses of DUI of-
fenders "no later than 30 days after a person is arrested for drunk
driving, in at least 60 percent of the cases."' 80 Although Penn-
sylvania meets the other three criteria for receiving the basic grant, a
back-log of cases and the traditional use of the preliminary hearing-
to-trial system often leads to a delay of three to six months before an
offender's driving privilege is suspended.' 8 ' Similarly, the state
otherwise would qualify for the supplemental grant if not for its lack
of expeditious licensing suspension.' 82 Until the Commonwealth
changes its current suspension system, increased enforcement of the
new law will remain economically unfeasible.
183
2. Congestion in the Courts Could Lead to Plea Bargaining. -
Additionally, the new law will encounter enforcement problems at
the trial level. Because the amended law severely restricts the discre-
tion that the district justices could exercise under the prior version, 184
all DUI cases now will go directly into the county court for disposi-
tion.'85 The new law will increase the caseload of an already over-
worked court system by as much as four hundred cases a year.' 86
Although the current law prohibits plea bargaining at the mag-
isterial stage of a DUI conviction, 87 the law contains nothing to pre-
clude plea bargaining at the trial level. 188 The sentencing judge has
the discretionary power to prescribe community service in lieu of a
jail sentence. 189 In light of the court congestion that the new law will
cause and the fact that not all DUI offenders are eligible for the
ARD program, 9 ° plea bargaining probably will become a common
practice. 191 For this reason, the judicial leniency that hindered en-
180. 48 Fed. Reg. 5546 (1983) (to be codified as 23 C.F.R. § 1209.3).
181. Telephone interview with Brad Mallory, supra note 172. See also supra note 177
(criteria for receiving basic grant).
182. Pennsylvania meets the first eight criteria for supplemental funding, see supra note
178, but fails to meet the additional requirement that provides: "[A] State must have in place
and implement or adopt and implement a license suspension system in which the average time
from date of arrest to suspension of a license does not exceed an average of 45 days. ... 48
Fed. Reg. 5554 (1983) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. § 1209.6(a)).
183. But see infra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
185. Today is DD-day in Pennsylvania.- Drunken driving law now in effect, The Morning
Call (Allentown, PA), January 14, 1983, at B-1, 3 (quoting Lehigh County President Judge
Martin J. Coyne).
186. Id (quoting Lehigh County District Attorney William Platt).
187. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(0 (1983).
188. Summary of Driving Under the Influence legislation, sent from Pa. Representative
George E. Saurman to Governor Richard Thornburgh (Nov. 15, 1982).
189. Nussbaum, New drunk law has already had an effect, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan-
uary 16, 1983, at C-l, 6 (quoting Governor Thornburgh's opinion that judges could sentence
drunk drivers to community service instead of jail).
190. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
191. Under the new law, however, the Commonwealth has the right to appeal directly to
the superior court if the lower court sentence does not conform to the mandatory provisions set
forth in the subsection on penalties. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 373 l(e)(4) (1983). This power
forcement of the former law may continue to be a problem.192
3. The Lack of ARD Programs Could Encourage Plea Bargain-
ing.-Even if the majority of first offenders are eligible for the Ac-
celerated Rehabilitative Disposition program, eleven counties
presently do not have approved ARD programs for dealing with
drunk drivers. 193 Before the enactment of the new law, twenty-three
counties had refused to adopt a procedure for offering the disposi-
tional alternative.' 94 The Pennsylvania Legislature believed that
mandating the state-wide establishment of ARD programs would
compel reluctant counties to implement an effective program.'95 The
problem remains, however, with those counties that are slow to insti-
tute an ARD system. Without an alternative disposition, the county
courts will be forced to plea bargain with accused drunk drivers or to
lock them up.' 96 Sentencing defendants, who otherwise are eligible
for ARD, to incarceration, will only increase the strain on an already
overcrowded jail system.'97 Additionally, judges may hesitate to im-
prison a driver whose offense has caused no personal or economic
injury, because of the resulting harm to the person's career, family
situation, or psychological well-being. 98 Therefore, counties having
no ARD program will witness an increase in plea bargaining, which
ultimately could decrease the deterrent effect the new law has on
could prevent plea bargaining to some extent, but would result in congestion of the courts at
the appellate level.
192. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
193. Roberts, Drunken drivers face stlff penalties, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 14,
1983, at 7. In addition, twenty counties have not yet joined the computerized Court Reporting
Network program, which is required by the new law. Id See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1548(a) (1983). See also supra note 66.
194. Memorandum prepared by the office of Pa. Representative George E. Saurman (R-
Ambler) (Jan. 6, 1983).
195. Id
196. Haggerty, First-Time Offenders Are Eligiblefor ARD Program, The Scranton Times,
January 14, 1983, at I (quoting Lackawanna County President Judge Edwin M. Kosik).
197. See generally Yaskin, Remarks on proposed drunk driving legislation, Vol. 5, No. 35
PENNSYLVANIA LAW JOURNAL-REPORTER 2 (September 13, 1982). Harold Yaskin, Assistant
Secretary-Treasurer of the State Public Defenders Association, stated the following objections
at an August 23, 1983 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing:
This bill has a financial impact even though there is nothing in the bill which
contains a money figure. . . . You will recall that six months ago, you passed a
mandatory minimum bill for violent offenders which provided for over $100 million
in state prison construction costs. How much will this bill, with mandatory county
prison sentences, cost local counties who already have overcrowded and out-dated
facilities? How much in transportation and boarding will this bill cost counties who
lack women's prison facilities?
Id
198. County jails may be dangerous places for drunk drivers. A short time after a Bucks
County drunk driver was incarcerated with several other prisoners, he was discovered dead
and no explanation was apparent. Id. As one commentator stated, courts will be reluctant to
imprison a family man who was arrested coming home with his wife "after consuming alcohol
purchased at a state store which had been served at a political cocktail party and the chemical
test revealed a .10." Maryniak, Lawyers Get Tips On How To Beat Drunk Driving Law, Pitts-
burgh Press, January 18, 1983, at A-12 (quoting attorney John B. Mancke).
motorists residing in those areas. 99
IV. Constitutional Analysis
In addition to the practical problems inherent in the new DUI
law, a handful of Pennsylvania motorists probably will attack the
constitutionality of the amended law. The major attacks will chal-
lenge the propriety of the law on grounds of due process and equal
protection.
A. Due Process Considerations
Due process of law mandates that all statutory language main-
tain a sufficient level of clarity to effectively warn persons that cer-
tain actions are proscribed by law.200 Under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, a law is impermissibly vague if it "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is for-
bidden by statute."' ' Although the new DUI law expressly warns
motorists not to drive while having a BAC of 0.10% or greater, 22 a
recent challenge to the per se provision contends that the law affronts
due process.20 3
This type of argument2z° asserts that the law fails to provide fair
notice of prohibited behavior because it is virtually impossible for an
individual to ascertain when his blood alcohol level reaches 0.10%.
The law implies that persons may drink and drive, but because of
the unpredictability of blood alcohol content, 20 5 a motorist is com-
pelled to guess at what point his otherwise lawful behavior becomes
illegal. Therefore, the argument concludes, the law is void for
vagueness.
This position, that the per se provision is impermissibly vague,
is tenuous. Other jurisdictions have rejected this argument, reason-
ing that, if a driver has a BAC of 0.10% or above, his physical and
199. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
200. The United States Supreme Court enunciated this standard in Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 447 (1927). See also Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in
Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REv. 77 (1948).
201. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see Note, The Void-For- Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
202. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 373 1(a)(4) (1983). See supra notes 92-94 and accompany-
ing text.
203. On February 16, 1983, a Harrisburg man, who has been charged with homicide by
vehicle while DUI, filed a constitutional challenge to the new law in Perry County. Common-
wealth v. Hernandez, 27 Pa. D. & C. 3d 334 (Perry C.P. 1983).
204. The argument set forth by Hernandez reportedly contends that the per se provision of
the new DUI law is vague and uncertain, thereby violating due process. Brutto, Drunk-Driving
Law Challenged in Court, The Patriot (Harrisburg, PA), February 17, 1983, at A-2. This same
argument was advanced in State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 817-16, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982). See
supra note 206 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
mental faculties will be impaired to a degree that his condition be-
comes self-evident. 2° Common sense suggests that an individual
knows when he has had too much to drink and, at that point, he has
adequate notice that he would be breaking the law if he attempted to
drive. It is not illegal to drink and drive; it is illegal to drive when
the drinking adversely affects driving.
Furthermore, a neighboring jurisdiction has held that when a
distinction between an unlawful and a lawful act is a matter of de-
gree, the due process requirement of specificity in defining the crimi-
nality of an act is diminished.2 °7 Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a legislature need only draft a law in as
precise terms as are possible, because the Constitution does not re-
quire a legislature to perform the impossible.208 In light of this deci-
sion, the new DUI law is sufficiently precise and will withstand a due
process attack.
B. Equal Protection and the New DUI Law
Persons have a right to be treated as equals.209 This right applies
to all interests and requires that the government treat each individ-
ual with equal regard as a person.210 When an individual is granted
a license to drive, he has an interest in that license, and the state
government must treat him as it treats other licensed drivers. A
drunk driving law singles out a specific class of individuals that will
be affected by the law-all drivers who drink.21' To withstand equal
protection scrutiny, this classification must be rationally related to
the intended purpose of the law.212 An attack against the new law
could contend that the law fails to comport with the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution because it fails to treat
206. State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 824-25, 639 P.2d 1320, 1324 (1982). This case
followed the earlier decisions of two states that struck down a similar due process challenge:
Roberts v. State, 329 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1976); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah, 1974).
Accord State v. Melcher, 33 Wash. App. 357 (1982).
207. People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d 513 (1979) (in which
the New York Court of Appeals concluded that if the difference between lawful and unlawful
behavior is a question of degree, a drunk driving law need only provide an ascertainable
meaning for prohibited behavior). See generally Note, The Application ofNew York's Driving
While Intoxicated Statute, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (1979-80).
208. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
209. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-1 to 16-20 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as L. TRIBE].
210. Id See generally Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341 (1949).
211. The Pa. Vehicle Code applies to the class of "all drivers." The DUI law applies to
the sub-class of "drinking drivers." It is this sub-class to which the equal protection analysis of
this section applies.
212. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). The classification
created by the law must be reasonable in light of the goal the law seeks to achieve. A law that
fails to treat all members of that class equally may indicate that private interests are involved
and render the law unconstitutional. L. TRIBE, supra note 209, at §§ 16-1, 16-7.
equally all persons who are similarly situated.213
The new law provides Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition
for the first offender whose DUI violation has caused no serious
harm.214 If a qualified offender accepts a judge's offer of ARD, he
must comply with certain conditions to avoid subsequent prosecu-
tion and conviction for drunk driving.215 One of these conditions is
that an ARD candidate must pay for all costs of the program.216 A
problem arises when a first offender is unable to comply with this
economic obligation. When that situation occurs, a judge may be
forced to revoke the offender's ARD status and instruct that the case
proceed to trial.2 17  As a consequence, the low income or indigent
driver, who otherwise could complete the ARD program success-
fully, may be sentenced to jail. Thus, the new law does not treat first
offenders equally because it impermissibly discriminates against mo-
torists of low economic means.
Case law indicates that the constitutionality of the new law
probably will be upheld.2 8 The creation of the new drunk driving
law was clearly within the police power of the Commonwealth.219
Because this legislation tends to promote the health, safety, morals
and welfare of the public, a strong presumption exists in favor of its
constitutionality.220 The state interest is to provide safe highways for
all citizens, regardless of whether they are motorists or not.221 Re-
moving drunk drivers from the highways is an effective means of
protecting highway users.222 The statutory language provides fair
warning of the consequences of drinking and driving,223 so the new
213. This argument was made in Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup.
Ct. 1954) (in which the court held that, since all drivers were affected by the DUI law in the
same way, there was no violation of equal protection).
214. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(d) (1983). See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying
text.
215. See supra note 89.
216. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(6)(i) (1983). An ARD candidate must attend
Alcohol Highway Safety School, a five-day course of 2 1/2 hours daily, which will cost approx-
imately $125. In addition, the individual will have to pay processing fees and court costs that
could bring the combined total to $475. Rhodin, New drunk driving law will increase case load,
The Morning Call (Allentown, PA), January 13, 1983, at B-9.
217. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(7) (1983), provides that, if any term or condition
of the ARD is violated, the court shall direct the state's attorney to proceed on the charges.
218. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (holding that if
the classification relates to the purpose of the law, equal protection is satisfied); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that the police statutes of a state may be declared unconsti-
tutional only when they are arbitrary or unreasonable).
219. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (in which the Court
acknowledged that the state's power to protect the health and safety of its residents is
"unquestionable").
220. See Cianfrani v. Commonwealth, 57 Pa. Commw. 143, 426 A.2d 1260 (1981) (hold-
ing that any statute that is necessary for the general good of the public is constitutional).
221. See Commonwealth v. Ebert, 31 Pa. Commw. 82, 375 A.2d 837 (1977) (in which the
court stated that the purpose of DUI legislation is to protect the public by denying drunk
drivers the privilege of using the road).
222. See supra notes 1-2.
223. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
law treats all drivers equally. The class drawn is "drivers who
drink," not "drivers who drink and can afford the consequences."
The goal is public safety, and the per se provision, by demanding
prudent driving behavior, is rationally related to the attainment of
that goal.224 The state's interest in saving lives far outweighs the in-
terest of those who drink and drive and then challenge the conse-
quences. Therefore, the new law should survive an equal protection
attack.
C. Search and Seizure Scrutiny
In addition to due process and equal protection attacks, another
consideration is the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable
searches. 225 Pennsylvania courts agree that the extraction of blood
or the administration of a breath test are searches within the mean-
ing of the Constitution.226 The courts have held that these types of
searches are constitutional because they are reasonable in light of
exigent circumstances. 227  In this respect, Pennsylvania case law is
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Schmerber v. California,228 which held that a police officer may com-
pel a motorist to submit to chemical testing without a lawful ar-
rest.229 Consent to testing is not required as long as the testing is
reasonable.23° Consequently, under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code, chemical testing administered on an arrested DUI suspect is
constitutional.
Nevertheless, a problem may exist with the use of Preliminary
Breath Testing Equipment.23' State case law indicates that probable
cause must exist before a motorist can be stopped and subsequently
arrested for drunk driving.232 The new law permits an officer to de-
tain a motorist and request that he take a PBT if "reasonable suspi-
224. Applying an equal protection analysis, the class affected is "drivers who drink." This
class is not a suspect class and does not involve a fundamental right. It involves a person's
driving privilege, which is not a fundamental right. Because the goal is safer highways, the
means used-deterring drunk drivers-is rationally related to that goal. See Wells v. Malloy,
402 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1975).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
226. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa. Super. 233, 385 A.2d 995 (1978) (holding
that when a chemical test is administered, it is equivalent to a search, and the suspect's consti-
tutional rights must be protected).
227. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rutan, 229 Pa. Super, 400, 323 A.2d 730 (1974) (holding
that because of the time delay that would occur if a warrant had to be procured, the warrant-
less testing of a DUI suspect is valid).
228. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that blood testing is not an unreasonable search and
could be administered without the suspect's consent).
229. Id at 767-70.
230. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 225 Pa. Super. 289, 302 A.2d 475 (1973) (holding that
a blood test is reasonable if incidental to a lawful arrest).
231. See supra notes 61, 78 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Commonwealth Dep't ofTransp. v. Schultz, 25 Pa. Commw. 598, 360 A.2d
754 (1976) (holding that, for a person's license to be suspended for DUI, the arresting officer
must have had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was intoxicated).
cion" exists that the individual was DUI. 23 3 The officer need not
inform the motorist that the PBT results are inadmissible, nor that a
refusal to submit to a PBT will not result in a license suspension.234
The legislation neglected, however, to define the term "reasonable
suspicion." Other sections of the law use the term"reasonable
grounds" to indicate probable cause.235
The dilemma arises when a motorist refuses to take a PBT.
Conceivably, an officer could interpret this refusal as probable cause
to arrest the driver for DUI. 236 It remains for the court to decide
whether the stopping of a motorist based on reasonable suspicion,
which ultimately may lead to arrest and conviction, conforms with
the probable cause requirement. Prior case law intimates that the
courts will examine the term using statutory construction analysis
23 7
and conclude that there is no indication that the legislature intended
to authorize arrests on less than reasonable grounds. 238  Thus, an of-
ficer may need probable cause to stop a motorist and ask that he
submit to preliminary breath testing. Regardless, this particular sec-
tion of the law is couched in ambiguity and warrants clarification.
D. The Right Against Se/f-Incrimination
Once a breath test yields results, the new DUI law provides that
those results are admissible in court.23 9 In the past, defendants have
contended that because an implied consent statute mandates an au-
tomatic license suspension for refusal to test,240 an accused is com-
pelled to forfeit his right against self-incrimination. 24 1 The attacks
have claimed that submission to chemical testing is a form of self-
incrimination.
In 1966, however, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that BAC evidence obtained from a blood test is merely physical in
233. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(k) (1983).
234. Guida, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39, at 4.
235. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(a) (1983).
236. If a driver is stopped based on reasonable suspicion and refuses to take a PBT, the
officer must decide whether to arrest him. If the officer decides to arrest the driver, he must
have probable cause that the driver was DUI. A person's refusal to take a PBT could indicate
an intention to "hide something" and thus give the officer reasonable grounds to believe that
the driver is intoxicated.
237. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1925 & 1928 (Supp. 1981) provide that legislative acts
will be presumed constitutional unless shown to be otherwise. Accord In re Jones, 286 Pa.
Super. 574, 429 A.2d 671 (1981) (holding that legislative enactments will not be declared un-
constitutional unless they clearly, palpably, and plainly violate the constitution).
238. See Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363, 325 A.2d 452 (1974) (in which
the court applied statutory construction analysis to the words "reasonable grounds" and deter-
mined the term was synonymous with probable cause).
239. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(c) (1983).
240. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(b)(1)(i) (1983). The constitutionality of
automatic license suspension for refusal to submit to chemical testing was upheld in Mackey v.
Montryin, 443 U.S. 1 (1978).
241. "No person shall ...be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
nature.242 The fifth amendment protects only communicative or tes-
timonial evidence.243 Therefore, the court concluded, the results of a
blood test for intoxication do not fall within the protection of the
right against self-incrimination. 2" Using this precedent, Penn-
sylvania courts have held that requiring a DUI suspect to submit to
breath testing, as well as blood testing, does not offend the Constitu-
tion.245 These decisions shield the new law from fifth amendment
challenges.
In addition to allowing BAC results to be admitted into evi-
dence, the new law permits the admission into evidence of a sus-
pect's refusal to submit to testing.246 The United States Supreme
Court recently has ruled that a driver's refusal is not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination.247 In light of this landmark de-
cision, Commonwealth prosecutors now can use a defendant's re-
fusal to test as evidence that the accused was DUI,248 and a
constitutional attack will not be forthcoming.
E. The Right to Trial By Jury
An argument also can be made that the amended law abridges a
DUI suspect's right to trial by jury. If a driver elects not to accept
ARD, he faces a factual determination that could result in a
mandatory jail sentence. 249 This, in turn, may intimidate the indi-
vidual's decision to challenge his drunk driving charge.25°
A constitutional attack based on the sixth amendment can only
succeed if the defendant is denied counsel, 25' a speedy trial,252 or an
impartial jury.25 3 Relevant case law gives no indication that the
sixth amendment is violated when a defendant's decision to exercise
242. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
243. Id at 761.
244. 1d. at 764-65.
245. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 259 Pa. Super. 88, 393 A.2d 730 (1978)
(which held that an oral refusal is nontestimonial and, hence, could be admitted into
evidence).
246. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(e) (1983).
247. State of South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1984) (reversing 312 N.Y.2d 723
(S.D. 1981)).
248. If a suspect is visibly intoxicated when arrested for DUI, the prosecution may decide
to proceed on the basis of the arresting officer's testimony or other eye witness testimony, even
if no BAC evidence was obtained.
249. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (1983).
250. If a DUI suspect is aware that the consequences of going to trial could be imprison-
ment, he may decide to elect the alternative disposition regardless of the circumstances sur-
rounding his arrest.
251. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (concluding that the right to counsel
in a criminal trial is a fundamental right). See also Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the
Right to Counsel: The Case Against Implied Consent, 58 TEX. L. REV. 935 (1980).
252. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (stating that a speedy trial is specifically
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution).
253. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (noting that the constitutional standard
of fairness requires that a defendant have an impartial, indifferent jury).
his right is affected by the potential outcome of the case. Similar to
other individuals charged with a crime, a DUI suspect has the right
to counsel and to confront his accusers.254 The suspect can consult
freely with his attorney to determine whether the Commonwealth is
capable of proving its allegations. Strategically, if the suspect knows
or is advised that the state can present conclusive evidence to estab-
lish his guilt, the motorist still can opt to accept ARD. Thus, an
alleged offender's situation is analogous to that of a non-DUI de-
fendant. A criminal defendant who learns of the state's ironclad evi-
dence may seek to plea bargain for a lighter sentence. The DUI
suspect also can seek the lighter sentence-ARD.
There is no statutory provision barring a DUI suspect from de-
fending himself before a jury of his peers. The individual has a right
to a trial by jury.255 Furthermore, he has an opportunity to avoid
trial and conviction by submitting to the ARD program.256 Because
no rights are withheld, the new drunk driving law does not violate
the sixth amendment guarantee of a trial by jury.
V. Nationwide Developments
With the enactment of Act 289,257 Pennsylvania became the
twenty-seventh state to adopt a per se drunk driving offense.2 58 Cur-
rently, two other states and the District of Columbia are considering
similar legislation, and five states have created task forces to investi-
gate the DUI anathema.259 These legislative initiatives have arisen
254. See Illinois v. Allen, 297 U.S. 337 (1970) (stating that the sixth amendment gives an
accused the right to confront the witnesses against him).
255. Nothing in the new DUI law intimates that a suspect cannot exercise his right to a
trial by jury. The decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), makes the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
256. If a suspect agrees to enter the ARD program, he does not face a conviction for DUI
or a fine, unless he breaks a condition of the program. See supra notes 87-91 and accompany-
ing text.
257. Act 289 is the new Pennsylvania drunk driving law. See supra notes 6-10 and accom-
panying text.
258. The per se laws of these twenty-six states are codified in the following: ALA. CODE
§ 32-SA-191(a)(l) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.0 30(a)(2) (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 28-692
(West Supp. 1982-83); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-227a (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177 (Supp. 1982); FLORIDA STAT. ANN.
§§ 316.193, 322.262 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 § 11-501 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982);
IOWA CODE ANN. 321.281 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. 8-1567 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
29, § 1312(5) (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-121(1)(d), 169.123(5a) (1982); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 577.012 (Vernon Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669 (1982); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 1192.2 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 20.17(2), 20.138(1) (1982); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902 (1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 487.540
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32-23-7 (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1201 (1982); REV. CODE WASH. ANN.
§ 46-61.502 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.63 (1982).
259. Ohio and Michigan both have legislation packages pending that would create a per se
violation. New Hampshire, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia have all insti-
tuted task forces. Roberts, COMPILATION OF STATE LAWS AND PROPOSED LAWS ON DRUNK
DRIVING, DUI SEMINAR, supra note 39.
in response to intense civic pressure260 and a growing concern for the
teenage drinking problem.26'
A. The California Model
The nationwide trend toward enacting tougher DUI laws began
in California.262 Since the passing of a per se law in 1981, Califor-
nia's lower courts have faced an onslaught of litigation concerning
the legality of the new law.263 To date, however, the state appellate
and supreme courts have not ruled on the constitutionality of the
DUI law.26
Pennsylvania's recently enacted law is strikingly similar to the
California statute. Both states mandate minimum penalties and of-
fer dispositional alternatives that offer rehabilitation and educa-
tion.265 In contrast, although the California law doles out stiffer
penalties for first offenders, it lacks the severity of the sanctions im-
posed by the Commonwealth on repeat offenders.266 It should prove
interesting to watch the effect that the California higher court deci-
sions have on other state courts that are called upon to adjudicate
the constitutionality of per se DUI laws. However, for the same rea-
sons expounded in the preceding section concerning the constitution-
ality of per se laws, the California Model should withstand a
constitutional challenge.267
B. The Laws of Neighboring States
Of the six states that border Pennsylvania, only New York
268
260. Groups, like MADD, RID (Remove Intoxicated Drivers) and S.O.B.E.R. have ac-
tively pushed for DUI law reform. In 1981, there was a 3.7% drop in fatalities reported in the
31 states that reformed their drunk driving laws. Tri-County MADD Statistical Report, supra
note 40.
261. Drivers under 20 years of age constitute less than 8% the total number of licensed
drivers in the nation, yet cause 25% of all drunk driving collisions that account for 8000 teen-
age fatalities a year. Id
262. The movement began with the organization of MADD in California. See supra note
3.
263. Woestendiek, Some see drunken-driving crackdownfailing the test, The Philadelphia
Inquirer, February 7, 1983, at 4-A.
264. Id.
265. Compare 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (1983) with CAL. VEHi. CODE § 23160(a)
(West Supp. 1982).
266. The California law mandates a minimum 48 hour jail sentence and a fine ranging
from $375-500. Id. For repeat offenders the law sanctions a standard penalty of 90 days to
one year in jail, and a fine ranging from $375-1000, but a repeat offender still is eligible for
probation. Id. at § 23165. An interesting example of the treatment accorded to first offenders
is found in the Los Angeles area. The jails have been inundated with DUI offenders; thus
judges now are sending violators who request it to the Torrance or Redondo Beach jails.
These persons, however, must pay for this privilege, and both jails now charge $75 a day. In
comparison, the Holiday Inn in that area charges only $55 a day. Hull Some Drunk Drivers in
Los Angeles pay $75 a Nightfor a Fancier Cell, The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 1983, at
16.
267. See supra notes 200-08, 223-30, 239-47 and accompanying text.
268. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
and Delaware269 have enacted a per se DUI crime, and unofficial
reports note that the drunk driving arrest rates in those states have
increased.27 ° Prior case law indicates that the New York and Dela-
ware per se laws will survive constitutional scrutiny at the state
level.2 7 ' The Delaware law is not as austere as its Pennsylvania
counterpart, but provides for quick and efficient enforcement.272
The New York drunk driving law utilizes a fine sharing system and a
probational alternative analogous to the Pennsylvania law.27 3 Un-
like the Pennsylvania law, however, both the New York and Dela-
ware statutes set a time limit within which a chemical test must be
administered to a DUI suspect.274
The remaining border states, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio and
West Virginia, enforce strict drunk driving laws without using a per
se offense. 27" Each of these states utilizes BAC test results to create a
presumption of drunk driving for prosecutorial purposes.27 6
VII. Recommendations
Pennsylvania's new drunk driving law will not be an effective
deterrent unless the law is strictly enforced. Studies indicate that se-
vere, mandatory penalties, standing alone, do not provide a solu-
tion.277 The key to establishing a successful deterrent lies in
269. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177 (Supp. 1982).
270. For example, in the past 3 1/2 moths there have been 1150 DUI arrests in Delaware.
Craft, Del. high court overturns new drunken-driving law, The Philadelphia Inquirer, February
4, 1983, at 3-B.
271. See, e.g., People v. Bradford, 96 Misc. 2d 298, 408 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1978) (holding that
statute governing DUI offenses is sufficiently clear to withstand a vagueness attack); State v.
Rucker, 297 A.2d 400 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1972) (Delaware court upholding validity of conviction
based on BAC of .10% and proof suspect was operating a vehicle).
272. Delaware uses an administrative license revocation system, in which arresting officers
immediately can confiscate the license of a DUI suspect, if the driver's BAC is 10% or more.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2742 (Supp. 1982).
273. Compare N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1982) with 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3731 (1983).
274. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177(b) (Supp. 1982) provides that chemical test must be
taken within four hours after the alleged offense. N.J. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney
Supp. 1982) provides for a two hour limit. Cf. supra note 152 and accompanying text.
275. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (West Supp. 1981); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-
902 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-8
(Supp. 1982).
276. New Jersey and Ohio use a .10% BAC limit as a presumption of DUI. Maryland sets
the presumption limit at .13% for prima facie evidence of drunk driving. West Virginia uses a
test result of .10% as prima facie evidence of guilt. Id
277. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have used a system of mandatory prison
sentencing for convicted drunk drivers for over forty years. Despite the widespread belief that
severe penalties deter potential offenders, there is no evidence that these laws have had any
substantial effect on the behavior of drinking drivers. Ross, The Scandanavian Myth.: The
Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving Legislation in Sweden and Norway, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES
285, 286-90 (1975).
Another commentator notes that if the severity of the penalties is not supported by public
opinion, the effectiveness of the law is questionable. Waller, Drinking and Highway Safety, in
DRINKING 117, 131-32 (J. Ewing & B. Rouse ed. 1978).
Governor Thornburgh expressed his opinion on the subject during the bill-signing cere-
improving the apprehension rate of DUI offenders.
A. Administrative Revocation of Driving Privileges
The problem of enforcement can be alleviated by obtaining sup-
plemental federal funding,27 8 which would enable the Common-
wealth to procure the equipment and manpower necessary to
provide statewide enforcement. This can be accomplished by adopt-
ing a practice of prompt licensing suspension.21 9 One such approach
involves on-site administrative revocation of licenses. Under this ap-
proach, which has been successfully implemented in four states,
280
an arresting officer can seize an individual's license if the suspect
refuses to submit to chemical testing, or registers a BAC of 0.10% or
greater. The driver is issued a temporary license and is notified that
he has a set time limit in which to appeal the action. If the driver
neglects to take action within that time frame, the temporary license
is invalidated. Regardless of the action taken by the suspect, his per-
manent license remains suspended during the interim period be-
tween seizure and final adjudicatory action. A sample statute, 28'
which could be amended to the new law by the Pennsylvania Legis-
lature, states as follows:
§ 1550. Administrative Revocation of Licensing Privileges.
(a) On behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, a police of-
ficer requesting a chemical test or directing the administration of a
chemical test shall serve immediate notice of revocation on a sus-
pect who refuses to submit to chemical testing after being in-
formed of the penalty of revocation for such refusal, or on a
suspect who is arrested for a violation of § 3731 of this title and
registers a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or greater as determined
by a chemical test. The officer shall take the Pennsylvania license
or permit of the driver in any such case and issue a temporary
license effective only for 10 days with a provision for an additional
period if a written request for a hearing is received by the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles within the 10-day period. The police of-
ficer shall send the suspect's driver's license or permit to the
Secretary along with certification by the police officer that reason-
mony: "I believe that education and treatment are more likely to be productive in [drug and
alcohol abuse] cases then imprisoning such persons. . . . Mandatory terms of imprisonment
should be a last resort, and not a first resort." Governor expresses concern about drunk-driving
penalty, The Evening News (Harrisburg, PA), December 16, 1982, at B8. For an overview of
this topic, see Note, Mandatory Jail Sentences.: An Effective Solution to the Drunk Driver Cri-
ses?, 55 WASH. L. REV. 677 (1980).
278. See supra 170-83 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 180 and accompanying text.
280. These states are Iowa, Minnesota, Delaware and West Virginia. Merry, States take
tougher, quicker action to stop drunken drivers, The Christian Science Monitor, January 27,
1983, at 3. During its first six months, the Iowa provision cost 7887 drivers their licenses, and
the road death total was 59 fewer than during the same period in 1981. Id California, Alaska,
and North Carolina presently are considering similar measures. Id.
281. The proposed statute is modeled after DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2742 (Supp. 1982).
able grounds existed to believe that the motorist had been acting
in violation of § 3731 of this title.
By adopting such a procedure, the Commonwealth would comply
with the NHTSA criteria for obtaining federal funding.2"2 The
money could be used to implement strict enforcement of the new
DUI law, thus creating a general deterrent based on action, not
publicity.283
B. Two-Step Blood Alcohol Testing
Even if the state receives the supplemental funding necessary to
increase its enforcement of the new law, the BAC evidence still can
be challenged at trial.284 One possible method of diminishing the
effectiveness of challenges made against the method of extrapolating
a suspect's BAC is a two-prong system of testing. This procedure
would eliminate the controversy surrounding whether a suspect's
BAC is declining or rising at the time of testing and thus would pro-
vide the state with a basis from which to extrapolate the test result
back to the time of arrest.285
Currently, Preliminary Breath Test results are inadmissible to
prove drunk driving.286 The legislature, in conjunction with the De-
partments of Transportation and Health, must promulgate guide-
lines to ensure the accuracy of field testing results. 2 87  Once a
standard procedure for testing is outlined and conducted on equip-
ment certified by the state, the PBT results could be given limited
evidentiary value. These results could not be used as prima facie or
presumptive evidence of DUI, but could be introduced for the sole
purpose of proving whether the suspect's BAC was rising or declin-
ing at the time of testing. A typical scenario would start with a po-
lice officer stopping a motorist on a reasonable belief that the driver
is DUI. The officer would administer a PBT to the suspect and
would base his decision to arrest the individual on the results of that
test. Upon arrest, the DUI suspect would be required to submit to
further breath testing for purposes of ascertaining guilt. If this sub-
sequent testing would indicate a BAC of 0.10% or more, the reading
could be compared to the PBT result to determine whether the sus-
pect's blood alcohol level was peaking at the time of the second test.
Once this would be established, a trained officer could extrapolate
back to the person's actual BAC at the time of arrest. Should the
trial defense attempt to rebut the state's evidence by introducing con-
282. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 145-65 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 147, 150 and accompanying text.
286. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(k) (1983).
287. The guidelines could follow the same format used in outlining the guidelines for
blood testing and station house breath testing. See supra notes 139-44 and accompaftying text.
trary extrapolation results, the prosecution would be permitted to in-
troduce the PBT results to substantiate the method used to determine
the accused's BAC. Consequently, the defense could not mathemati-
cally prove that the defendant's BAC was within the legal
parameters.
C. Roadblocks
In addition to obtaining the necessary funds and offering con-
clusive evidence at trial, another solution that would serve to in-
crease enforcement of the law is the use of nondiscretionary
roadblocks. Random vehicle stops, although controversial, have
been used effectively in neighboring states.288 Under such a pro-
gram, state or local police either stop, for example, every tenth car,
or set up roadblocks and test all drivers for BAC using field test
equipment similar to the PBT. Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has suggested that random vehicle stops will with-
stand constitutional scrutiny.289
By initiating a "roadblock" program in conjunction with the
two previously mentioned recommendations, law enforcement agen-
cies could expeditiously patrol the highways at times when drinking




The Pennsylvania judiciary's attitude toward drunk driving was
summarized dramatically in Commonwealth v. Kurtz.
29
288. Delaware and Maryland have instituted successful "roadblock" programs. Woes-
tendiek, Some see drunken-driving crackdownfailing the test, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Febru-
ary 7, 1983, at i.
289. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664-65 (1979), Justice Blackmun, with whom
Justice Powell joined in concurring with the opinion, stated:
The Court . . . carefully protects from the reach of its decision other less intru-
sive spot checks "that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." The
roadblock stop for all traffic is given as an example. I necessarily assume that the
Court's reservation also includes not purely random stops (such as every 10th car to
pass a given point) that equate with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock
stop.
290. Another method for deterring drunk drivers is the establishment of a system for citi-
zen reporting of DUI offenders (used in Nebraska and Washington). Some see drunken-driving
crackdownfailing the test, supra note 288, at I. Minnesota has erected roadside signs that use
the Burma Shave-style of advertising: "It's best... for one . . . who hits the . . . bottle...
to let another . . . use the throttle." Id A final method uses shame to deter drunk drivers.
Several papers in Iowa and Missouri regularly print the names and addresses of motorists
arrested for driving under the influence. States take tougher, quicker action to stop drunken
drivers, supra note 280, at 3.
Currently, enforcement efforts have been stepped up throughout Pennsylvania. For ex-
ample, Dauphin County statistics indicate that in a recent three month period, drunk driving
arrests have increased 166%. Jury, Drunk-Driving Arrests Up, The Patriot (Harrisburg, PA),
February 11, 1983, at I. Without increased funding, however, the enforcement trend undoubt-
edly will be short-lived.
291. No. 4311, Vol. 103 (Dauphin County, July 23, 1982).
In speaking generally of the results of driving motor vehicles
while under the influence of alcohol, we are reminded of the dying
words of another Kurtz, "He cried in a whisper at some image, at
some vision,-he cried out twice, a cry that was no more than a
breath-'The horror! The horror!' ,292
America's drunk-driving problem has grown to epic propor-
tions. Yet, society's condonation of alcohol abuse, which has been
especially prevalent during the 1980s, is rapidly being challenged by
concerned citizens' groups. z93 In response to public demands, state
legislative efforts have produced a plethora of tough anti-drunk driv-
ing laws. With the enactment of a new per se criminal statute, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has joined in the nationwide effort
to curb the drunk-driving threat.
Until supplemental funding is available, however, enforcement
of the new Pennsylvania law will be sporadic. Yet, the legislature
can provide the answer to the Commonwealth's diminutive enforce-
ment capabilities. By amending the new law to comply strictly with
federal guidelines, the state could obtain the funding essential for
establishing an effective deterrent. Swift action would replace the
''scare" tactics that currently attempt to dissuade the public from
drinking and driving.
Nevertheless, the cessation of drunken driving ultimately will
occur through the shifting of public attitudes, not through penal ret-
ribution. Money, time and effort should be expended on educating
the public to the deleterious effects of drinking and driving.29 4 Until
this task is accomplished, the question will linger, "Is the party really
over in Pennsylvania?"
EDWIN W. TOMPKINS III
292. Id at 361.
293. In 1940, one author expressed his attitude in this fashion:
Beverage alcohol is fecal matter. Alcohol is not made of grapes or grain or other
attractive foods. It is these which are devoured by the ferment germ, and the germ
then evacuates alcohol as its waste product. The thought of swallowing the excre-
ment of a living organism is not an aesthetic idea but people will do such things.
SMITH AND HELWIE, LIQUOR: THE SERVANT OF MAN 25 (1940). Though attitudes have not
gone to this extreme in modem society, a movement has begun that condemns alcohol abuse.
294. One effort that may help is the state's distribution of charts showing the amount of
alcohol that may be consumed before a person attempts to drive a vehicle. See Appendix C.
See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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GOVERNOR'S DUI TASK FORCE REPORT
Governor, Harrisburg, PA) (October 14,
ALCOHOL RELATED ACCIDENTS
1977-1981
Reproduced from GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DRUNK DRIV-
ING, IT'S TIME TO TREAT DRUNK DRIVING LIKE THE CRIME IT IS!
THE PARTY'S OVER, (Circulated Pamphlet, 1983).
APPENDIX B
The following table shows the symptoms normally associated
with drinking and its resultant blood-alcohol concentrations in a
drinker of average weight (about 160 lbs.). It must be stressed, how-
ever, that this table can only be used as a very rough guide. In actual
fact, the symptoms of different amounts of alcohol vary enormously
with the individual.
DRINK CONSUMED
2 oz. 90 proof whiskey
or about 2 12 oz.
bottles American beer
4 oz. 90 proof whiskey
or about 4 12 oz.
bottles American beer
6 oz. 90 proof whiskey






8 oz. 90 proof whiskey
or about 8 12 oz.
bottles American Beer
12 oz. 90 proof











He feels "on top of the
world," and relaxes.
Further affects moral and
physical control centers.
Drinker becomes gayer,
may take some personal
and physical liberties.
Drinker begins to stagger
and sway and speech may
become slurred. Reflexes






driving are results of this
amount of intoxication.
Function of lower motor
and sensory areas of brain
is now definitely impaired.
At this state, virtually all
drinkers, no matter how
"seasoned" begin to show
evidence of slowed reflexes
and poor judgment-both
morally and physically.
The drinker may begin to
see double and feel sleepy.
There is now a marked
inability of gait. The
drinker is obviously drunk,
needs help to walk or
undress, and tends to fall
asleep.
14 oz. 90 proof
whiskey or about 14
12 oz. bottles
American beer
14-20 oz. 90 proof
whiskey or about 14-
20 12 oz. bottles
American beer
24-28 oz. 90 proof
whiskey or about 24-






primitive areas of brain.
Senses are dulled. Drinker
falls into stupor.






Puts to sleep the lowest
level of brain, including
center controlling the heart
and respiration. Finally
the heart stops. For
alcohol to cause death in
this way though, more
than a quart of whiskey
(or its equivalent) must be
drunk in a short time.
APPENDIX C
The following is an example of a Blood Alcohol Content predic-
tion table that the Pennsylvania Legislature originally had wanted to
circulate in state liquor stores and establishments selling alcoholic
beverages:
The amount of alcohol it takes to reach the .10 percent level
depends on your body weight and how quickly you drink. Gener-
ally, a 160-pound person will be legally drunk after drinking five
drinks within an hour (five 12-ounce beers; or five 4-ounce glasses
of wine; or five 1 1/2-ounce shots of liquor). As a general rule, if
you have only one drink per hour, you are not likely to become
too drunk to drive.
APPROXIMATE BLOOD ALCOHOL PERCENTAGE
Drinks Body Weight in Pounds
100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
1 .04 .03 .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
2 .08 .06 .05 .05 .04 .04 .03 .03
3 .11 .09 .08 .07 .05 .05 .05 .05
4 .15 .12 .11 .09 .08 .08 .07 .06 Danger
5 .19 .16 .13 .12 .11 .09 .09 .08 Zone
6 .23 .19 .16 .14 .13 .11 .10 .09
7 .26 .22 .19 .16 .15 .13 .12 .11
8 .30 .25 .21 .19 .17 .15 .14 .13 Legally
9 .34 .28 .24 .21 .19 .17 .15 .14 Drunk
10 .38 .31 .27 .23 .21 .19 .17 .16
Reprinted from GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DRUNK DRIV-
ING, IT'S TIME TO TREAT DRUNK DRIVING LIKE THE CRIME IT IS!
THE PARTY'S OVER, (Circulated Pamphlet, 1983).
